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The Role of the States in the
Regulation of Private Placements
Manning Gilbert Warren III'
INTRODUCTION
THE Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
2 (JOBS Act), signed into law bythe President on April 5, 20121 after passage by Congress with bipartisan
support, was ostensibly designed to promote job creation by eliminating
perceived securities regulatory impediments to capital formation by small
businesses.4 After all, the prevailing argument was that small businesses are the
engine for job development in our economys and, particularly in a presidential
election year, high unemployment is a problem that has to be addressed through
deregulation.' In the end,with scant attention to the detail that only a tiny subset
1 H. Edward Harter Chair of Commercial Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University
of Louisville. The author thanks Thomas A. Rutledge, Carolyn Duncan, and Thomas P. Borg for
their helpful comments, as well as Professor Rutheford B Campbell, Professor James D. Cox, and
the other participants at the Kentucky LawJournal's symposium, The SecuritiesAct ofs93 at o:Does
It Provide Fair and Efficient Access to Capital?, held at the University of Kentucky College of Law
on October 11, 2013 .The author also gratefully acknowledges the contributions of his administrative
assistant, Janet Gribbins Sullivan, in the final preparation of this Article.
2 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. I12-1o6, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(codified in scattered sections ofI5 U.S.C.).
3 Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks at the JOBS Act Bill Signing (Apr. 5, 20M2),
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/o5/remarks-
president-jobs-act-bill-signing). President Barack Obama observed at the time he signed the
JOBS Act that "because we're still recovering from one of the worst recessions in our history, the
last few years have been pretty tough on entrepreneurs." Id. The President stated, "[o]ur job is to
help our companies grow and hire. That's why I pushed for this bill."Id. He expressed his especial
support for the JOBS Act crowdfinding provisions:
Right now, you can only turn to a limited group of investors - including banks and
wealthy individuals - to get funding. Laws that are nearly eight decades old make it
impossible for others to invest. But a lot has changed in 8o years, and it's time our laws
did as well. Because of this bill, start-ups and small business will now have access to a
big, new pool of potential investors - namely, the American people. For the first time,
ordinary Americans will be able to go online and invest in entrepreneurs that they
believe in.
Of course, to make sure Americans don't get taken advantage of, the websites where
folks will go to fund all these start-ups and small businesses will be subject to rigorous
oversight.
Id.
4 See Press Release, House Comm. on Fin. Servs., H.R. 2940, the Access to Capital for Job
Creators Act (Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/blog/?postid=2635I 5.
5 See, e.g., 158 CONG. REc. S16 9 o (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012) (statement of Sen.Thune).
6 See generally America's Capital Markets: A Muffled Big Bang, EcoNoWsT, Mar. 31, 2012,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/2t551483. According to one financial journalist,
"Congress seems to have been moved ... by the appealing title-at a time of high unemployment,
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of small businesses actually create jobs,' Congress passed a deregulatory statute
applicable for the most part to all businesses, large and small, from Facebook
and large hedge funds to college students creating iPhone applications in their
proverbial garages. The JOBS Act's primary provisions include authorization
for crowdfunding, higher shareholder thresholds before companies become
subject to periodic reporting requirements,10 significant relief from regulatory
and disclosure requirements in registered public offerings for "emerging growth
companies,"" a tenfold increase in amounts that can be raised in Regulation
no one wants to vote against an act with'jobs'in the title, even if it is actually short for'Jumpstart
Our Business Start-ups Act.'"Id.
7 Congress failed to note that of the 27 million small businesses in the United States, less
than one-fourth have any employees and a much smaller percentage ever grow beyond twenty
employees. Aaron Chatterji, Why Washington Has It Wrong on Small Business, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
12, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB00o4240527023o3 7 681o457746004o42946365o
. The vast majority of jobs created come from new startups (mostly between one and five years
old), a handful of which grow into global enterprises. Ned Smith, Small Business Startups Create
the MostNewJobs, BUSINESsNEwsDAILY (Aug.31, 20o, 11:55 PM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.
com/i 73-small-business-startup-companies-helping-new-job-growth.html. Most government
reforms intended to aid small business fail to distinguish between the subset of high potential
startups and small businesses generally. Moreover, while startups do generate new jobs, these highly
volatile ventures also destroy the most jobs. Id. In addition, some experts have suggested that the
greatest impediment to startup businesses is the heavy load of college loan debt. See Ruth Simon,
Student-Loan Load Kills Startup Dreams, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 14, 2013, at Ci, available at http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBIooo'424I27887323446404579oo8930399820764. Many potential
entrepreneurs simply cannot invest their time and other resources in hopes of deferred returns
but, instead, must seek full time traditional employment in order to earn steady income for student
debt repayment. According to Vivek Wadhwa, a Stanford Law School fellow, "[t]he single largest
inhibitor to entrepreneurship is the student loans."Id. at C2.
8 See Tyler Adam, Note, 7e JOBS Act- Unintended Consequences of the "Facebook Bill," 9
HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 99, loo-o, 113 (2012); see also Steven M. Davidoff, Facebook and the joo-Person
Threshold, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/20IOL/oo3/facebook-
and-the-Soo-person-threshold/.
9 See JOBS Act §§ 301-305 (2012) (codified in scattered sections oft5 U.S.C.). See generally
C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. I,
87-98; C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise Unfulfiled, 40 SEC.
REG. L.J. 195, 197 (2012); Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and
the Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REv. 1735, 1754-57 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway, What Is a Security in
the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J 335,356-57 (2012); Joan MacLeod
Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of
1933,78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 937-60 (2011).
10 SeeJOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 1r2-Io6, § 6o, 126 Stat. 306,326-27 (2012). See generally Donald
C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Securities Reglation After the
JOBS Act, 1o GEo. L. 337, 339 (2013). For an interesting discussion on pre-enactment pressure
for regulatory revisions, see Jean Eaglesham, US. Eyes New Stock Rules: Regulators Move Toward
Relaxing Limits on Shareholders in Private Companies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2o, at Ai, available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBoool4240527487o463ooo45762 4918227513 4 552.
ss See JOBS Act §§ ior-jo8.
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A offerings,12 and removal of the long standing prohibition on general
solicitation in connection with private placements of securities under Rule 506
of Regulation D." The last provision is by far the most radical in its impact on
the dual securities regulatory structure in the United States.14
Pursuant to the JOBS Act statutory mandate, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) recently amended Rule 506 to eliminate the prohibition on
general solicitation in certain private offerings of securities." In one fell swoop,
the Commission has authorized issuers to publicly offer unlimited amounts of
securities to the whole world through internet websites, print and broadcast
media, public presentations and seminars, and even advertisements on buses
and billboards, without registration or other presale review by federal or state
regulatory authorities. Not only is the issuer free from filing a prolix disclosure
document with regulatory agencies, the issuer is not required to prepare and
provide any disclosure document for investors. To preserve its exemption from
registration, the issuer must only take reasonable steps to "verify" that the actual
purchasers are accredited investors, 6 as defined in Regulation D' to include,
among other categories, individuals that have had annual income of $200,000
(or $300,000 jointly with spouse) for the past two years and expect to have such
in the current year," or, alternatively, have a net worth of $1 million, excluding
the equity in their primary residence." Although issuers are now permitted to
broadcast their marketing campaign to the public (i.e., the nation's population
are all offerees), issuers can sell only to accredited investors. At the current
thresholds, this group of targeted investors in the United States alone would
be roughly 8.5 million households.20 At Congress's behest in the JOBS Act,
12 See generally JOBS Act § 402; Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Regulation A. Small Businesses'
Search for "A Moderate Capital", 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 79-82 (2oo6) (discussing the need to revise
Regulation A so that it will be a more useable tool for small businesses).
13 See JOBS Act § 20I. See generally Stuart R. Cohn, Securities Markets for Small Issuers: The
Barrier ofFederal Solicitation andAdvertising Prohibitions,3 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 1,7, 12-13 (1986); Patrick
Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on General Solicitation, 38 EMORY L.J. 67, 68-70 (1989) (arguing for
reform to the ban on general solicitations).
14 See generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A
Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495 (1984) [hereinafter Warren, Dual Regulation].
15 See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising
in Rule 5o6 and Rule i4 4A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release
No. 69,959, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,771, 44,774 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230,
239 & 242). See generally Split SEC Clears JOBS Act Advertising Rule, Issues Proposal on Enhanced
Requirements, 45 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 1285 (Jul. 15, 2013).
16 Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 5o6 and Rule i44A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No.
69,959,78 Fed. Reg. at 44,771.
17 17 C.F.R. § 230.50i(a) (203).
18 Id. § 230.505(a)(6).
19 Id § 230.5oi(a)().
20 See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-i 3-6 4o, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
CoMMIssIoN: ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA FOR QUALIFYING AS AN ACCREDITED INVESTOR SHOULD
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the SEC has recently transformed what originated as a private placement safe
harbor under Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 193321 (1933 Act) into a
lawful unregistered public offering of securities. 2
I will not address several issues in this Article that I have addressed
elsewhere, including the issue of whether wealth is an appropriate proxy for the
intellectual and physical access to material information about issuers and their
securities,23 as required under Section 4(a)(2) 24 according to the Supreme Court
in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co. 25 While wealth may suggest the ability to fend
for one's self, it barely evidences any ability to evaluate the merits and risks of
investments in securities. Similarly, I will not address questions associated with
the new verification requirements that the SEC has imposed with respect to
generally solicited Rule 506(c) offerings.2 6 Indeed, a rapidly developing cottage
industry of independent third party verification services providers has already
emerged. 27 Instead, I will address how the elimination of the prohibition on
BE CONSIDERED 18 (2013) [hereinafter GAO ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA].
21 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77 d(a)(2) (2012).
22 Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule i4 4 A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No.
69,959,78 Fed. Reg.44,771,44,804-05 (July 24,2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230,239 & 242).
23 Seegenerally Manning Gilbert Warren III,A Review ofRegulation D: 7he Present Exemption
Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 993, 33 Am. U. L. REV. 355, 381-82 (1984)
[hereinafter Warren, Review ofRegulation D].
24 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
25 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-27 (1953). See generally Manning Gilbert
Warren III,An Essay on Rule 5o6 ofRegulation D: Its Questionable Origins, Regulatory Oblivion and
Judicial Revitalization, 38 SEc. REG. L.J. 4 (2010) [hereinafter Warren, Essay on Rule5o6].
26 See 17 C.ER. § 230.506(c) (2013). The SEC, in imposing accredited investor verification
requirements, provided both a principles-based method of verification and four specific non-
exclusive methods of verifying accredited investor status. Eliminating the Prohibition Against
General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 5o6 and Rule x44A Offerings, Securities
Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No. 69,959, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,776, 44,780. The
specific methods of verification were adopted by the SEC based on its belief "that the potential
for uncertainty and the risk of participation by non-accredited investors is highest in offerings
involving natural persons as purchasers." Id. at 44,778. Based on my discussions with numerous
securities lawyers, the verification methodology most likely to be employed will be self-certification
by investors through suitability questionnaires accompanied by representation letters provided by
their certified public accountants. Despite its prescribed methodologies, the SEC did express its
recognition of "the general concern regarding possible misuse of the new Rule 5o6(c) exemption to
sell securities to those who are not qualified to participate in the offering" and promised to closely
monitor the verification practices that evolve. Id. at 44,782.
27 See, e.g., ACCREDITED INVESTOR SOLUTIONS, http://www.accreditedinvestorsolutions.com
(lastvisitedMar3,204);AccreditedlnvestorVerification,CROWDBOUNCER,http://www.crowdbouncer.
com/accredited-investor-verification (last visited Mar. 21, 2014); Accreditation Verification on
SecondMarket, SECONDMARKET, http://www.secondmarket.com/education/avp (last visited Mar.
21, 2014); REGISTRY OF ACCREDITED INVESTORS, http://www.registryofaccreditedinvestors.com
(last visited Mar. 21, 2014); The CAlProgram, CROWDENTIALS, http://www.crowdentials.com/cai.
php (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). SecondMarket advertises online its "General Solicitation Solution,"
offering companies and investment funds the opportunity "to offload the entire administrative
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general solicitation has affected the states as partners with the SEC in our dual
regulatory system.28
First, I will describe the regulatory context, briefly detailing the states'
already truncated role in the regulation of securities offerings and, more
particularly, securities privately offered under Rule 506(b) of Regulation D,1'
which might be referred to as the quiet Rule 506, as well as the states' equally
truncated role in the regulation of publicly offered securities under Rule 506(c)
of Regulation D,30 which might be referred to as the noisy Rule 506.1 will then
address the roles the states might assume going forward after this most recent
reallocation of regulatory responsibilities. State regulatory authorities have vital
responsibilities to their local communities and must devote their resources not
only to late stage, post-transactional enforcement against abusive issuers and
their promoters, but also to early stage, presale enforcement in order to protect
their targeted populations before they are victimized. I will suggest that state
regulators should more intensively scrutinize both types of Rule 506 offerings
to ensure that issuers and their promoters are conducting their offerings in
satisfaction of the exemption's regulatory conditions, including its new "bad
actor"rules.3 ' In other words, in a play on the adage, "if you can't beat them,join
them," the states should do all that they can to ensure compliance by issuers
with the federal Rule 506(b) and 506(c) exemptions. After discussion of the
states' regulatory authority to review all Rule 506 offerings of putative covered
securities, under what I submit is a complementary state and federal framework,
I will recommend uniform Form D review guidelines for further development
by state regulators.32 I will then encourage the North American Securities
Administrators Association" (NASAA), with the states' fill support, to
burden and heightened regulatory requirements related to generally soliciting [investors]." See
General Solicitation Solution, SECONDMARKET, http://www.secondmarket.com/education/lending/
general-solicitation-solution (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). See generally Eric Markowitz, Here Comes
SecondMarket's SecondAct, INc., http://www.inc.com/eric-markowitz/second-market-second-act-
sec-ruling.html (last updated July 11, 2013) (explaining the effects of lifting the ban on general
solicitation on the third-party investor verification services industry).
28 See Warren, Dual Regulation, supra note 14, at 537-
29 17 C.F.R. § 230.5o6(b).
30 Id. § 230.506(c). Rule 5o6(c), adopted by the SEC pursuant to the JOBS Act section 2o
mandate, finds its statutory authority in section 4 (b) of the 1933 Act, providing that the registration
provisions of section 5 shall not apply to "[o]ffers and sales exempt under section 230.506 of title
17, Code of Federal Regulations (as revised pursuant to section 20! of the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act) shall not be deemed public offerings under the Federal securities laws as a result of
general advertising or general solicitation." Securities Act of 1933 § 4 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7d(b) (2012);
see also JOBS ACT, Pub. L. No. 112-1o6, § 201, 126 Stat. 306,3I3 (202).
31 17 C.F.R. § 230.5o6(d); see Disqualification of Felons and Other "Bad Actors" from Rule
506 Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9414, 7 8 Fed. Reg. 44,730 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230 & 239).
32 See infra Part III.A.
33 The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), was formed in
5959 and is the oldest international organization devoted to investor protection. See NASAA, http://
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promptly implement its long envisioned Electronic Form D depository (EFD)
to coordinate the filing and review of Form D notifications required by both
Regulation D and the states, 3 4 as I have previously suggested." Finally, I will
strongly recommend that NASAA consider the development of a centralized
"bad actor" database (BAD). The database would provide issuers, attorneys,
accountants, broker-dealers, and investors access to information about adverse
criminal and regulatory histories, which under the SEC's recently adopted
Rule 506(d) 6 disqualify issuers from any use of the Rule 506 exemption."
A BAD system would not only benefit issuers and their counsel through early
stage detection of bad actors in proposed offerings but might also, at least in
the absence of actual knowledge, provide a "best practices" method to satisfy
the reasonable care exception to disqualification." It would also significantly
enhance the far-reaching investor education programs continually developed
by the Financial Industry Regulatory Association39 (FINRA), NASAA, state
regulatory authorities, and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to
reduce investor susceptibility to fraudulent schemes. 40 Investors, by accessing
www.nasaa.org (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). Its membership includes sixty-seven states, provincial,
and territorial administrators in the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, Canada, and Mexico. Id.
34 See infra Part III.B.
35 See generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities:
A Case for Reallocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 78 WASH. U. L.Q 4 9 7 (2000) (extolling the
virtues of coordination of state and federal filing requirements in order to promote uniformity)
[hereinafter Warren, Reallocation].
36 17 C.F.R. § 23 0.5 06(d) (2013).
37 See infra Part III.C.
38 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.5o6(d)(2)(iv) (2013).
39 The Financial Industry Regulatory Association (FINRA), successor to the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), is the self-regulatory organization authorized by
Congress to protect investors through the regulation of the securities industry, including more than
4100 securities firms with approximately 635,800 brokers.About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.
org/AboutFINRA (last visited Mar 21, 204).The FINRA Foundation has awarded over $83 million
in grants for the development of investor protection educational and research programs since 2003.
Id. See generally FINRA INVESTOR Enuc. FOUND., http://www.finrafoundation.org (last visited
Mar. 21, 2014) (highlighting the FINRA Foundation's financial education initiatives through grant
funding and programming).
40 NASAA has developed its NASAA Fraud Center to educate investors about investor
traps, avoiding scams, and the red flags of fraud. See Investor Education, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.
org/investor-education (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). Additionally, it has developed a Senior Investor
Resource Center and regularly issues investor alerts. Id. Its member-state and provincial regulatory
agencies have also devoted significant resources to investor education. For example, the Alabama
Securities Commission not only provides links to NASAAs investor education programs, but also
provides links to Kiplinger's brochures and other investor education materials financed by the
Investor Protection Trust. Investor Education & Fraud Prevention, ALA. SEC. COMMISSION, http://
www.asc.state.al.us/InvestorED.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). The British Columbia Securities
Commission has been particularly dedicated to investor protection, developing its InvestRight
website to provide investor alerts, information on how to avoid investment scams, and tools for
investment decisions. For Investors, B.C. SEC. COMMISSION, http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/investors.aspx
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a highly publicized BAD system, would be able to identify recidivist bad
actors, colloquially referred to as "frequent flyers," before their money is lost
in fraudulent schemes. Ihe states, by acting collectively through NASAA to
establish a BAD list, would significantly enhance their efforts to protect local
investors in their communities. State regulators, not SEC staff in Washington
or its eleven regional offices, continue to be the boots on the ground, serving as
the only public consumer protection agencies for retail investors.
I. THE REGULATORY CONTEXT OF RULE 5o6 OFFERINGS
A. The Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act of 193341 was adopted "to protect investors by promoting
fill disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment
decisions."42 Section 5 of the 1933 Act,43 its core provision, makes it unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, to offer4 any security unless a registration
statement containing the prescribed disclosures has been filed with the SEC.45
Further, Section 5 makes it unlawful for any security to be sold before that
registration statement has been declared effective. 46 The statute is highly
restrictive on the issuer's communications during the period the issuer is "in
registration," 47 and, generally, with certain key exceptions, 48 prohibits the use
(last visited Mar. 21, 2014). In addition, since 2004 it has successfully incorporated financial literacy
materials as a component of Planning to, a mandatory tenth grade life skills course in British
Columbia. Id. Its diligence in the field of investor education led Canada's Financial Consumer
Agency to license the Planning so: Finances course and publish it online for free use by teachers
throughout Canada. Interview with Ken GraceyMedia Relations, in Vancouver, B.C. Sec. Comm'n
(Sept. 27, 2013).
41 Securities Act ofI933, Pub. L. No.73-22,48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at I U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (2012)).
42 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953).
43 Securities Act of 933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
44 The terms "offer to sell,""offer for sale," and "offer" are defined to include "every attempt
or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value."
Id. § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3).
45 See id. § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
46 Id § 5(a)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(i).
47 The term "in registration"refers to "the entire process of registration, at least from the time
an issuer reaches an understanding with the broker-dealer which is to act as managing underwriter
prior to the filing of a registration statement and the period of 4o to 90 days during which dealers
must deliver a prospectus." Guidelines for Release of Information by Issuers Whose Securities Are
"in Registration," Securities Act Release No. 5180,36 Fed. Reg. 16,506 n.s (Aug. 20, 1971).
48 See generally Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange
Act Release No. 52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,725
(Aug. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 243, 249 & 274). In
Securities Offering Reform, the SEC adopted exceptions to the "quiet period" prohibition on
pre-filing communications. Id. The most noteworthy of these exceptions was for "well-known
seasoned issuers," which are permitted to engage in unrestricted oral and written selling activities
2013- 20141 977
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of any written communications unless they satisfy the statute's prospectus
requirements.49 Issuers are generally prohibited from any efforts to condition
the market for their securities in advance of providing the required disclosures,
an unlawful course of action referred to as "gun jumping."s0 Thus, even in
connection with full-blown registered public offerings involving intensive due
diligence by counsel for the issuer and its underwriters and formal review by the
SEC's staff, the issuer is not permitted to engage freely in general solicitation
and advertising of its securities to investors.'Ihus, in a broad sense, the securities
laws have not generally permitted issuers in even registered public offerings
to engage in unrestricted marketing to the population at large. Reversing
this long standing paradigm, the JOBS Act and the SEC's new Rule 506(c)
exemption oddly authorize issuers, including non-reporting startup companies,
to undertake with impunity unregistered public offerings of securities without
any formal disclosure requirements.
At the time the 1933 Act was passed, state regulation of securities,
popularly known as "blue sky laws," was well established, with virtually all
the states having already passed securities legislation.s" Indeed, a majority of
state administrators advised Congress that because many fraudulent interstate
schemes were beyond their reach, "a supplemental federal law [was] needed
to stop this gap."S2 Congress, in passing the 1933 Act, as well as the other
federal securities statutes, was careful to preserve, and not to preempt, these
state regulatory schemes. It specifically enacted a savings clause in the 1933 Act
before filing a registration statement. See 7 C.ER. § 230.I63(a) (2013);Joseph F. Morrissey, Rhetoric
and Reality: Investor Protection and the Securities Regulation Reform of 2005, 56 CATH. U. L. REV.
561, 573-74 (2007). More recently, Congress provided in section lo5(c) of the JOBS Act another
exception for "emerging growth companies," which are permitted to communicate with "qualified
institutional buyers" and institutional accredited investors to "test the waters" to determine if such
investors would be interested in the contemplated securities offering. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(d), i5
U.S.C. § 77e(d) (2012), amendedbyJOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-1o6 § io5(c) 126 Stat. 306,31o (2012).
49 Id. § 5(b), I5 U.S.C. § 77e(b).
50 The prohibition against gun jumping was designed to prevent an issuer from "conditioning
the public mind or arousing public interest in the issuer" before the dissemination of accurate
and current information through a registration statement filed with the SEC. See Publication
of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date of a Registration Statement, Securities Act
Release No. 3844, 22 Fed. Reg. 8359, 8359 (Oct. 24, 1957). See generally Eric A. Chiappinelli, Gun
Jumping.: The Problem of Extraneous Offers of Securities, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 457 (1989); Morton A.
Pierce, Current and Recurrent SectionS Gun Jumping Problems, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 370 (1976);
Comment, Preregistration Publicity in an Exchange Offer, 1z9 U. PA. L. REv. 174, 174-75 (1970); Note,
Prereorganization Negotiations and Securities Act Section S(c): A Proposed Solution to the Gunjumping
Problem, 24 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 731 (1973).
51 See S. REP. No. 73-47, at 2 (1933).
52 Federal Securities Act: Hearings on HR. 4314 Before the H Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 73 d Cong., ist Sess. 93, 101 (1933) (Dept. of Commerce Study of the Economic and Legal
Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act).
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preserving the power of the states to regulate securities.5 In doing so, Congress
established a dual regulatory system that has largely flourished ever since. 54
B. National Securities Market Improvement Act of1996
Congress dealt a major blow to our dual regulatory system when it passed
the euphemistically entitled National Securities Market Improvement Act of
1996ss (NSMIA). With deregulatory fervor approaching the level of religious
zealotry, Congress preempted state registration authority over a broad swath
of securities offerings. As I have previously written, Congress, among other
things, gutted the states' registration authority over a number of securities and
securities transactions that were already exempt from federal registration.s6 Most
significantly for this discussion, it preempted state registration for all securities
transactions exempt by SEC rule under the private offering exemption set forth
in Section 4(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 7 the only such rule being Rule 506 of the
SEC's Regulation D.s'
Rule 506 had been adopted by the SEC some fourteen years earlier in order
to provide a safe harbor under Section 4(a)(2) for "transactions by an issuer
not involving any public offering."s" Although I have seriously questioned the
SEC's authority under Section 4(a)(2) to even promulgate Rule 506,60 after the
anointment of securities offered under the rule as "covered securities," it rapidly
became the exemption of choice for virtually all issuers intent on sidestepping
both the intensive disclosure regime imposed by Section 5 of the 1933 Act and
the disclosure regimes of the states. In brief, the rule permits issuers to offer
securities in an unlimited aggregate offering amount to an unlimited number of
offerees and to an unlimited number of accredited investors without any formal
disclosure requirements. 6 1 Moreover, until recently, it could even be used by
so-called "bad actors," a term including convicted felons and others previously
found to have violated state and federal securities laws.62 Under the rule as
53 See Securities Act of 1933 § 6,15 U.S.C. § 77P.
54 Warren, Dual Regulation, supra note 14, at 497.
ss National Securities Market Improvement (NSMIA) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
56 See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor Protection: Constitutional
Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies for Securities Fraud, 6o LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169
(1997).
57 See Securities Act of 933 § i8(a), (b)(4 )(E), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a), (b)( 4)(E).
58 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013).
59 Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77 d(a)(2) .
60 See Warren, Essay on Rule 5o6, supra note 25.
61 Rule 502(b) of Regulation D specifies comprehensive disclosure requirements for
issuers that rely on the Rule 5o6 exemption from registration, but specifically exempts from these
requirements sales of securities to "any accredited investor." 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2013).
62 The SEC, in its promulgation of Regulation D, disqualified issuers from using the Rule
505 exemption for securities offerings of s5,ooo,ooo or less if the issuer, its affiliates, or securities
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originally adopted, the only major constraint imposed on issuers was the rule's
prohibition on general solicitation and advertising," and its use was further
subject to a condition, later eliminated by amendment,"4 requiring issuers to
file a Form D notification with the SEC.6s While NSMIA granted the states
the right to require that those Form Ds also be filed with them, together with
filing fees,6 6 the statute precluded the states from imposing their own additional
disclosure requirements on these unregistered offerings and from conducting
any presale review of the disclosures, if any, that the issuer determined to provide
offerees and actual purchasers of the offered securities." Although NSMIA
radically revised the 1933 Act's savings clause that originally preserved state
authority, it did leave the states with the residual authority to investigate and
bring enforcement actions for securities fraud,6 1 to suspend offerings as a result
of the failure to submit required filings and fees, 9 and, presumably, left intact
the states' authority to determine the registration and disclosure requirements
applicable to issuers of securities that were not deemed "covered securities" and
thus free from NSMIAs preemptive effect. However, as historical experience
has repeatedly demonstrated, it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for
intermediaries had previously engaged in certain specified conduct that violated the federal
securities law. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(iii) (2013). These "bad boy" disqualifiers were derived from
Rule 262 of Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.262, another regulatory exemption adopted under the
authority of section 3 (b) of the 1933 Act. Securities Act of 1933 § 3 (b), r5 U.S.C. § 77c(b). However,
the SEC did not apply these disqualifiers to issuers using the Rule 5o6 exemption for securities
offerings of unlimited amounts under Rule 506. See Warren, Review ofRegulation D, supra note 23,
at 380 n.A88.
63 See V7 C.FR. § 230.502(c). Rule 502(c), as applied to Rule 506 offerings, prohibited the
issuer and any persons acting on its behalf from offering or selling securities "by any form of
general solicitation or general advertising, including, but not limited to ... [a]ny advertisement,
article, notice or other communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or
broadcast over television or radio; and ... [a]ny seminar or meeting whose attendees have been
invited by any general solicitation or general advertising."Id.
64 Regulation D; Accredited Investor and Filing Requirements, Securities Act Release No.
6825, 54 Fed. Reg. 1I,369, 11,370 (Mar. 20, 1989) (to be codified at V7 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230 & 239). In
eliminating the filing of Form D as a condition to the availability of the Regulation D exemptions,
the SEC added Rule 507,17 C.F.R. § 230-507, to provide an incentive for issuers to file the Form Ds.
See id. For a general discussion of this regulatory evolution, see Electronic Filing and Revision of
Form D, Securities Act Release No. 8891, Exchange Act Release No. 57,280, Investment Company
Act Release No. 28,i45, 73 Fed. Reg. 10,592 (Feb. 27, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. ptS. 230, 232
& 239).
65 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a) (2013).
66 See NSMIA § zo2(a) (1996), S U.S.C. § 77r(c)(2)(A) (2012).
67 See § I02(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(i)-(3).
68 § 102(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(I).
69 § io2(a), S U.S.C. § 77r(c)(3).
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investors to recover their investment losses after the fact from dishonest issuers
and promoters.70 One prominent state regulator has portrayed this dilemma as
follows:
I know a guy who has a match and intends to burn down the forest, but I
cannot walk over and blow out that match. Instead, I have to wait until the
forest has been set on fire before I'm allowed to call in the fire department.
Even if I catch the arsonist, the trees are gone."
NSMIAs preemption of the states' authority to monitor their own registration
and exemptive schemes through presale review has severely diminished
their roles as gatekeepers for the protection of investors in their respective
communities.
By preempting state registration authority over securities issued pursuant
to Rule 506, Congress channeled offerings away from other federal exemptive
schemes in to Rule 506. Once NSMIAs preemptive effect was in place,
issuers and their counsel, by resort to Rule 506, could lawfully avoid disclosure
requirements applicable under the registration and exemptive schemes of the
states, as well as related compliance costs and potential liabilities. Offerings
under any other federal exemption from registration, including, among others,
the statutory intrastate exemption at Section 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act, 2 the
private placement exemption at Section 4(a)(2),n and the small offering
exemptions promulgated under Section 3(b),74 remained subject to pre-offer or
presale scrutiny at the state level, either under state registration requirements or
state exemptions from registration that provide additional investor protection.s
Congressional engineering through NSMIA ensured the issuer's default resort
to the federally exempted and state preempted Rule 506.6
Moreover, Congress deprived investors ofthe presale protection that had been
previously provided by state regulatory schemes and state regulatory authorities.
70 See, e.g., Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks on Increasing
the Vulnerability of Investors (Aug. 29, zotz), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2o2/
spcho829s2laa.htm ("In most cases, much of investors'monies are long gone by the time a fraud is
identified and an action can be brought.").
71 Interview with Joseph P Borg, Director, Alabama Securities Commission (Sept. 18, 2013).
72 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(ii) (2012).
73 See id § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(z).
74 Id. § 3 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 77 c(b). Under its section 3(b) authority, the SEC has promulgated
exemptions from registration in Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.505
(2013), and Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263 (2013).
75 See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., 7he Wreck of Regulation D: 7he Unintended (and Bad)
Outcome for the SEC's Crown jewel Exemptions, 66 Bus. LAw. 919, 922 (201). Congress inexplicably
preempted state regulatory authority over securities offerings compliant with an SEC administrative
rule, subject to administrative repeal or amendment by the SEC at any time. Id. At the same
time, this largely left the 1933 Act's statutory exemptive scheme in place, with complementary state
regulation, in the dual regulatory system. Id. I agree, at least in part, with my colleague Professor





Since NSMIAs enactment, state regulatory authorities have experienced
a surge in investor complaints against dishonest issuers and their promoters
who were enabled to launch their offerings without any federal or state presale
review and, thereafter, abscond with the savings of investors.n Moreover, state
registrations of local offerings exempt under the federal intrastate exemption
have virtually disappeared. Congress, as I have stated previously," apparently
forgot that it enacted many of the federal exemptions, including the private
placement exemption under which Rule 506 was promulgated, based on its
own recognition that the states already provided sufficient presale protection
for investors." It has long been recognized that investors in unregistered private
offerings, particularly those in which no reputable financial intermediaries are
involved, need more protection than in any other type of securities offering.so
Yet Congress not only chose to exempt these offerings from its federal regime,
but it also chose to preempt the states from implementing their own regulatory
regimes regarding these private offerings of securities." In doing so, it created
a huge regulatory gap for the very offerings in which investors need the most
protection.
Following passage of NSMIA, issuers, with understandable expedience,
made Rule 506 their federal exemption of choice under Regulation D.
According to a recent report prepared by the SEC's Division of Economic
and Risk Analysis (DERA) analyzing Form Ds electronically filed with the
SEC, as required by Regulation D, some 99% of the amounts of securities sold,
approaching $1 trillion annually, were offered in reliance on Rule 506.2 Almost
77 Legislative Proposals to Facilitate SmallBusiness Capital Formation andJob Creation: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov't Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
12th Cong. 29, app. at 1-12 (2011) [hereinafter Absbure Testimony] (statement of Heath Abshure,
Arkansas Securities Comm'r, on behalf of North American Securities Administrators Association,
Inc. (NASAA)), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRC-112hhrg 726o4/pdf/CHRG-
12hhrg7260 4 .pdf. According to former NASAA President Jack Herstein, NSMIA's preemption of
state authority to review Rule 506 offerings prior to sales made the Rule 5o6 exemption "a haven for
investment fraud," and "the most frequent source of enforcement cases handled by state securities
regulators." Jack E. Herstein, Election-Year Politics Trump Investor Protection, HILL (Mar. 5, 2012,
8:52 PM), https://www.thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/216339-election-year-politics-
trump-investor-protection.
78 See Warren, Dual Regulation, supra note 14, at 515.
79 Id.; see also Warren, Reallocation, supra note 35, at 504.
80 See Edward M. Cowett, Federal-State Relationships in Securities Regulation, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 287, 293 n.36 (1959) ("[T]he greatest measure of protection [for the residents of the
respective states] is warranted in the case of such securities or transactions."); Thomas Z. Wright,
Correlation of State Blue-Sky Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 26 CORNELL L.Q 258, 271 (1941)
("[T]here arises here a group of securities in the regulation of which the [states] must continue to
be vigilant if adequate investor protection is to be rendered ... ."). See also Warren, Dual Regulation,
supra note 14, at 519.
81 See Warren, Reallocation, supra note 35, at 498-99.
82 VLADIMIR IVANOV & SCOTT BAUGUESs, U.S. SEC. & ExcH. COMMN, Dsv. OF EcoN. &
RISK ANALYSIS, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS
USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION, 2oo9-2012, at ii (2013) [hereinafter DERA 2013 STUDY],
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90% of these issuers reported that they did not use financial intermediaries,
namely broker-dealers, in conducting their private offerings." During a
period commencing in 2009, when the SEC first mandated the electronic
filing of Form D,4 and ending in 2012, nonfinancial issuers engaged in over
40,000 private offerings with a median offer size of under $2 million,ss and
those issuers that were "not pooled investment funds" generally conducted
offerings for $1 million or less." In addition, two-thirds of all Regulation D
offerings represented new equity capital and not debt securities." Moreover,
the study reported that 90% of these offerings were purportedly made solely to
accredited investors." Most significantly, the study concluded that the evidence
reviewed suggested "an active and vibrant market for private offerings compared
to registered offerings, and [that this] is inconsistent with the view that there
are significant frictions in the capital raising process that prevent issuers from
funding investment through private offering channels."" It surmised, in effect,
that the evidence did not support frequently heard claims that the SEC's rules
somehow stifled private investment in the nation's small businesses.90
C. 7heJOBSAct
Despite this lack of evidence and, indeed, with an excessively deregulated
securities marketplace for unregistered offerings of securities in which neither
the SEC nor the states engaged in presale review of those offerings, Congress
enacted the JOBS Act in 2012 to further deregulate our securities markets.
In an election year, with enormous political pressure on both parties to do
something about the high unemployment rate lingering from the Great
Recession of 2008, Congress, with its public approval rating at 9%," could
hardly vote against a statute superficially hailed as a historically significant job
creation measure.9 The JOBS Act was a package of bills designed to eliminate
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/whitepapers/dera-unregistered-offerings-reg-d.
pdf.
83 See id. at s6.
84 Electronic Filing and Revision of Form D, Securities Act Release No. 8891, Exchange Act
Release No. 57,280, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,145, 73 Fed. Reg. 10,592, 10,592 (Feb.
27, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232 & 239).
85 DERA 2013 STUDY, supra note 82, at 12 fig.6b & tbl.3 .
86 Id. at 12.
87 See id. at 9,10 fig.5.
88 See id. at 3.
89 Id. at io.
90 Id. at 5.
91 See 158 CONG. REc. S168 7 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2012) (statement of Sen. McConnell).
92 Indeed, the JOBS Act, originated by President Barack Obama's Council on Jobs and
Competitiveness-two-thirds of which were corporate chairmen and CEOs-was a "boon for
venture capitalists, large tech companies and Wall Street banks."Zach Carter & Ryan Grim, Obama
JOBS Act Leaves Labor Fuming in Democratic Feud, HUFFINGTON PosT (Apr. 5, 2012, II:39AM),
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or weaken federal and state securities laws as they applied to small businesses on
the grounds that these laws, as opposed to rational market restraints, were the
principal barriers to capital formation. The crowdfunding bill, first introduced
as the Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act and endorsed by the Obama
Administration, provides a new registration exemption for crowdfunded
securities offerings to retail investors. 93 Although not yet implemented by
SEC rules that Congress mandated in the statute, the JOBS Act authorizes
issuers to engage in unregistered, generally solicited offerings of securities to
the general public, with no requirement that investors be accredited.94 It further
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2zo/o4/o5/obama-jobs-act-laborni 4o44oi.htm. With broad
bipartisan support, the measure was adopted "despite vocal opposition from consumer advocates,
federal regulators and the largest U.S. coalition of labor unions, who warned of increased risk of
financial fraud." Id. Both President Obama and House Majority Leader Eric Cantor were said to
be "eager for a bipartisan photo-op."Id
93 Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. (20II), IS7 CONG. REc. H618i
(daily ed. Sept.14, 2011) (statement of Rep. McHenry); see Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(6),15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(4 )(a)(6) (2012).The statutory exemption states that the registration provisions of the 1933 Act
shall not apply to transactions
involving the offer or sale of securities by an issuer (including all entities controlled by or
under common control with the issuer), provided that-(A) the aggregate amount sold
to all investors by the issuer, including any amount sold in reliance on the exemption
provided under this paraph during the 12-month period preceding the date of such
transaction, is not more than si,ooo,ooo; (B) the aggregate amount sold to any investor
by an issuer, including any amount sold in reliance on the exemption provided under
this paragraph during the 12-month period preceding the date of such transaction, does
not exceed-(i) the greater of s2,ooo or 5 percent of the annual income or net worth of
such investor, as applicable, if either the annual income or the net worth of the investor
is less than sioo,ooo; and (ii) io percent of the annual income or net worth of such
investor, as applicable, not to exceed a maximum aggregate amount sold of stoo,ooo, if
either the annual income or net worth of the investor is equal to or more than sioo,ooo;
(C) the transaction is conducted through a broker or fun in portal that complies with
the requirements of section 4A(a); and (D) the issuer complies with the requirements
of section 4A(b).
Id.
94 The SEC recently proposed, but has not yet adopted, crowdfunding rules that essentially
follow the statutory structure established by Title III of the JOBS Act and codified at section 4(a)
(6) of the 1933 Act. See Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470, Exchange Act Release No.
70,741, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,429 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239,
240 & 249). In the SEC's view, Congress enacted the crowdfunding exemption "to help alleviate
the funding gap and accompanying regulatory concerns faced by startups and small businesses in
connection with raising capital in relatively low dollar amounts." See id. at 66,430. The proposed
rules have been designed to present the general public, accredited and non-accredited investors
alike, with "an opportunity to invest in an idea or business and individuals decide whether or
not to invest after sharing information about the idea or business with, and learning from, other
members of the crowd." See id. After the SEC proposed its crowdfunding rules, one reporter
questioned whether crowdfunding "will thrive or become largely a vehicle for fraud." See Steven M.
Davidoff, Trepidation and Restrictions Leave Crowdfunding Rules Weak, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2013,
at B5 , available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/Io/29/trepidation-and-restrictions-leave-
crowdfunding-rules-weak/. Observing that even the experts in startup investments, the venture
capitalists, have only a 20% success rate, he concluded that "you will have better odds at the casino
than investing in crowdfunded companies." Id. Indeed, state securities regulators have predicted
that "a combination of fraud, high failure rates for startups and an'inevitable advertising onslaught
of pie-in-the-sky offers'will kill investor confidence in buying shares online." See Jean Eaglesham,
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designates these securities "covered securities," thus preempting registration
or any other form of presale review by the states.s Professor John Coffee, in
testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, stated that the bill, which he
characterized as the "The Boiler Room Legalization Act of 2011,"would likely
create "few jobs ... and much fraud."96 Other measures enacted in the JOBS Act
include the creation of an on-ramp for a new category of issuers designated as
emerging growth companies (EGCs) with relaxed disclosure requirements," an
increase in the number of shareholders a company must have before triggering
registration and periodic reporting requirements under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act)-from 500 shareholders to 2000 shareholders (subject
to a maximum of 500 non-accredited investors),98 an increase in the amount
that can be raised in a Regulation A offering from $5 million to $50 million,9
and, incredibly, the elimination of the long standing ban on general solicitation
in Rule 506 offerings.'o Professor John Coates, a Harvard economist, agreed
with similar testimony from Professor Coffee that the deregulation achieved by
the JOBS Act would not create jobs.' In fact, Professor Coates testified that
investors generally respond to weakened investor protection by demanding an
increased risk premium.'02 According to his testimony, the JOBS Act would
actually ratchet up the cost of capital, negating and possibly exceeding any
savings in compliance costs the legislation might produce.o3
Crowdfunding Eforts Draw Suspicion, WALL ST.J.,Jan. I8, 2013, at Ci, available at http://online.wsj.
com/news/articles/SBooo04242788732378370457824738o8483946oo. For a compendium of recent
scholarship on the crowdfunding exemption, see articles cited supra note 9.
95 Securities Act of 1933 § i8(b)(4)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7r(b)(4)(C).
96 SpurringJob Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Afairs, 112th Cong. 13, 61, 64 (20x) (prepared statement
of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School),
available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore
id=d 580503c-a7f3- 4 db5-b9f5--968do3af374f-
97 See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. i,2-io6, §§ 1or-1o8, I26 Stat. 306, 307-313 (2012) (codified in
scattered sections of IS U.S.C.).
98 See id. §§ 303(a), 501 (codified at IS U.S.C. § 781(g) (2012)); see also Div. of Corp. Fin.,
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Frequently Asked Questions on Changes to the Requirements for
Exchange Act Registration and Deregistration, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Apr. In, 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfjobsactfaq-i2g.htm.
99 See JOBS Act § 4 o(b)(2) (codified at 1S U.S.C. § 7 7r(b)(4 )(D) (2012)); see also U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-2-8 3 9, SECURITIES REGULATION: FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT
TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS 2 (2012).
100 SeeJOBS Act § 201 (codified at IS U.S.C. § 77d(b)(2)).
lo See Examining Investor Risks in Capital Raising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins.,
&Inv. ofthe S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & UrbanAffairs, Izth Cong. 4-5,27-28 (ZoI) (statement
of John C. Coates IV, John F. Cogan Jr. Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School),
available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore-
id=id24b4 2e- 3ef8- 4 653 -bfe8- 9 c47674ofafa.
102 See id. at 30-31.
103 See id. at 28,30-37
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Before its enactment as Title II of the JOBS Act, the bill directing the SEC
to eliminate the ban on general solicitation under Rule 506 originally provided
for an amendment of Section 4(a)(2) of the 1933 Act.'" This amendment
would add to Section 4(a)(2)'s statutory exemption for "transactions by an
issuer not involving any public offering" the proviso: "whether or not such
transactions involve general solicitation or general advertising." 0 5 If this
language had been enacted, it would have rendered unintelligible the entire
regulatory scheme of the 1933 Act. Section 5's required registration of public
offerings would be juxtaposed against a revised Section 4(a)(2) providing an
exemption of public offerings from registration. The Supreme Court's decision
functionally interpreting the term "public offering"t 1 and the historically
recognized parameters of the Section 4(a)(2) exemption would have been
eviscerated. Fortunately, the proposed Section 4(a)(2) amendment was stricken
from the bill because of the fear of unintended consequences.'10 7  he JOBS Act,
as revised, added a new Section 4(b) to the 1933 Act providing that offers
and sales exempt under the SEC's Rule 506 "shall not be deemed public
offerings under the Federal securities laws as a result of general advertising or
general solicitation."'0 It directed the SEC to revise Rule 506 to ensure that
104 Access to Capital for Job Creators Act, H.R. 2940, 112th Cong. (2011) (as passed by
House), 157 CONG. REc. H623 0- 31 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2oz) (statement of Rep. McCarthy).
105 H.R. 2940 § 2(a) (proposing amendment to section 4(a)(2) of Securities Act of 1933);
see also 158 CONG. REc. Hi26o-6i (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. McCarthy). After its
introduction by Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) on September 15, House Bill 2940 was passed in
the House by a 413-11 vote on November 3, 2011. Legislative Digest, H.R. 2940, GOP.Gov (Nov. 3,
2on), http://www.gop.gov/bill/i2/u/hr2940. Senator John Thune (R-SD) introduced the bill in
the Senate as Senate Bill 1831 on November 9, 2on. Access to Capital for Job Creators Act, S.
1831, 112th Cong. (2011). Instead of the Senate voting on Senate Bill 183, it was re-incorporated
into a larger legislative package introduced by Rep. Stephen Fincher on Dec. 8, 2zoi as House
Bill 3606, which would eventually become the JOBS Act. Reopening American Capital Markets
to Emerging Growth Companies Act, H.R. 3606, I12th Cong. (2011). Title II of the JOBS Act
replaced its predecessor bill, House Bill 2940. Compare H.R. 3606, with JOBS Act, Pub. L. No.
ii2-io6, § 201, 126 Stat. 306,3I3-315 (2012). Subsequently, Rep. McCarthy offered Amendment to,
which would narrow the legislative course the bill would take to allow general solicitation in Rule
5o6 offerings sold only to accredited investors (i.e., the amendment struck the additional proviso to
section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and simply directed the SEC to eliminate the ban on
general solicitation under Rule 5o6). 158 CONG. REc. HI26o-6i (daily ed. Mar. 7,2012) (statement of
Rep. McCarthy); see also JOBS Act § 20z(a).
io6 See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119,124-25 (1953).
107 Rep. Kevin McCarthy, after his bill's passage by the House of Representatives and its
reincorporation in House Bill 3606 as Title II of the JOBS Act, proposed Amendment io to strike
the section 4(a)(2) amendment and to add a new section 4 (b) to the 1933 Act directing the SEC
to eliminate the ban on general solicitation in offerings exempt under Rule 5o6 and sold only
to accredited investors. See 158 CONG. REc. HI26o-6i (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep.
McCarthy). In support of his amendment, Rep. McCarthy explained that his amendment resulted
from consultation with the SEC that led him to realize that "the language in the bill could have
had some unintended consequences that may have limited the effectiveness of the provision or
expanded its reach beyond what we originally intended."Id at H1z6o.
1o8 JOBS Act § 2o(b)(2) (codified at15 U.S.C. § 7 7d(b) (2012)).
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the prohibition on general solicitation and general advertising in Rule 502(c)
of Regulation D shall not apply to offers and sales made pursuant to Rule
506(c),"provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors."'s
The revised bill stated further that issuers be required "to take reasonable steps
to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited investors, using such
methods as determined by the Commission."" 0 Congress's efforts to avoid
"unintended consequences" demonstrated a startling failure to comprehend its
own regulatory scheme under the 1933 Act. To legislate a generally solicited
private offering exemption under an SEC rule promulgated under the authority
of a statutory Section 4(a)(2) exemption that does not permit general solicitation
is patently absurd.
NASAA, state securities regulatory agencies, the Consumer Federation
of America (CFA), the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP),
numerous other organizations, and individuals testified against the JOBS Act,
with particular intensity against Title II lifting the ban on general solicitation in
Rule 506 offerings."' Heath Abshure, the Arkansas Securities Commissioner
and former NASAA president, in his testimony against the legislation,
emphasized the pernicious impact NSMIA's preemption of state regulatory
authority over Rule 506 offerings had already had on investors throughout the
country.112 Because private offerings, as a result of NSMIA, "receive virtually
no regulatory scrutiny," he explained, "the exemption is being misused to steal
millions of dollars from investors through false and misleading representations
in offerings that provide the appearance of legitimacy without any meaningful
scrutiny of regulators.""' Providing specific examples of securities fraud suffered
by retirees, the disabled, and other investors in Rule 506 offerings, he advised
that NASAA had identified private offerings as one of "the top trap[s] facing
investors."114 His words fell on deaf ears. Instead of heeding the serious concerns
of state regulators and other investor advocates, Congress decided to exacerbate
investor risks by extending Rule 506's preemptive effect from privately offered
Rule 506 securities to publicly offered Rule 506 securities.115 While the states
had previously been able to enjoin issuers who violated the general solicitation
restraint on Rule 506 offerings, they would no longer be able to do so. Congress,
in Title II of the JOBS Act, ordered the SEC to amend Rule 506 to allow
109 JOBS Act § zoi(a)(I).
no Id.
ns During the JOBS Act debate, Senator Mary Landrieu (D-LA) submitted for inclusion
in the Congressional Record numerous letters in opposition, including letters submitted by the
AARP, NASAA, the Council of Institutional Investors, and the AFL-CIO. 158 CONG. REc. S17 i6-
26 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012) (statement of Sen. Landrieu).
112 See Abshure Testimony, supra note 77, at 29 app. at 57-59-
n13 Id. at 58.
114 Id.




issuers to publicly offer Rule 506 securities, working a monumental expansion
of NSMIA's preemptive effect.116
D. The Dual Rule 506 Exemptions
The SEC, as the federal government's only investor protection agency, was
understandably unenthusiastic about implementing the JOBS Act mandate
to amend Rule 506 to allow generally solicited private offerings." 7 During a
protracted period following enactment of the JOBS Act, the SEC reviewed
public comments on how it should implement Congress's mandate." Subject to
relentless pressure to act within the JOBS Act's ninety-day deadline, the SEC
even considered whether to issue an interim final rule."lThe SEC pushed back
and ultimately decided not to issue an interim rule but to propose Rule 506(c)
and related measures for public comments.12 o Almost a full year later, the SEC
adopted final rules lifting the ban on general solicitation in Rule 506 offerings
116 Id.
117 See The JOBS Act in Action Part II: Overseeing Effective Implementation that Can Grow
American jobs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARI? Fin. Servs. & Bailouts ofPub. & Private Pro-
grams of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, ui2th Cong. 5(2012) (statement of Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg7559o/pdf/CHRG-II2hhrg7559o.pdf (testifying that the 90-day dead-
line imposed by the Act "simply does not provide time for drafting a new rule .... ").
n8 Soon after the JOBS Act became law, the SEC invited comments on the JOBS Act
initiatives to assess views of the general public before proposing rules as mandated by the statute.
See Public Comments on SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under the JOBS Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
CoMMIssioN (June 25,20I2),http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/jobsactcomments.shtml. For comments
related to Title II's elimination of the prohibition of general solicitation in Rule 506 offerings,
see Comments on SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under the JOBS Act: Title H - Access to Capital for Job
Creators, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobs-
title-ii.shtml (last modified Jan. 27, 2014).
11g See Joe Mont, SEC Won't Issue Interim Rule for Private Placement Pitches, Delays Meeting,
COMPLIANCE WEEK (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.complianceweek.com/sec-wont-issue-interim-
rule-for-private-placement-pitches-delays-meeting/article/255245.The SEC originally planned to
fast-track regulatory implementation of the statutory abolition of the ban on general solicitation
under the Rule 506 exemption. SeeJean Eaglesham &Telis Demos, SEC ChiefShapiro DelayedRule
Over Legacy Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2012 7:44 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SBr000 4 24 I27 887 3 24 20 540457 8i 5 3 693968634 504. In May 2o2, the SEC staff recommend the
commissioners issue an "interim final rule" in August immediately ending the ban. Id After strong
opposition was expressed by the Consumer Federation of America, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro,
fearing she would be "tagged with an Anti-Investor legacy," decided to follow the customary
rulemaking process requiring public notice and comments on rule proposals. Id. Adoption of an
interim rule was strongly opposed by numerous consumer and investor protection advocates. See
e.g., Letter from Fund Democracy, Inc., et al. to Mary Shapiro, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm'n
(Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-59.pdf.
120 See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising
in Rule 506 and Rule r44A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9354,77 Fed. Reg. 54,464 (proposed
Sept. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.ER. pts. 230 & 239)-
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to verified accredited investors.'21 The final rule, in effect, bifurcates Rule
506 into two distinct exemptions: The first retains the traditional Rule 506
exemption, as Rule 506(b),122 for offerings made to accredited investors,
non-accredited investors, or both, in which general solicitation is prohibited.
The second establishes a new Rule 506(c)123 exemption for generally solicited
offerings sold solely to verified accredited investors.124 It is important to note
that issuers relying on the Rule 506(c) exemption will not be able to also rely
on the statutory private placement exemption (or the Rule 506(b) exemption)
since any use of general solicitation in a Rule 506(c) offering would preclude
that reliance.m5 As stated by the SEC in its release, "[A]n issuer relying on
Section 4(a)(2) outside of the Rule 506(c) exemption will be restricted in
its ability to make public communications to solicit investors for its offering
because public advertising will continue to be incompatible with a claim of
exemption under Section 4(a)(2)."12 6 The JOBS Act mandate, according
to the SEC, was intended to affect only the Rule 506 safe harbor and not
Section 4(a)(2) offerings in general.' 27 It is hard to imagine the drafters at the
SEC wrote these new rules with straight faces. If Section 4(a)(2) of the 1933 Act
does not permit public advertising, then how could Rule 506(c), a rule issued
under the authority of Section 4(a)(2), be compatible with that prohibition?
The answer, I suppose, is that Congress simply legislated this absurd result, that
is, "reality is what we say it is."The SEC, in convoluted logic, essentially agrees:
"Congress' directive in Section 201(a)(1) of the JOBS Act, and not Section
4(a)(2) of the Securities Act or our interpretation of Section 4(a)(2), is the
reason that Rule 506,'. .. shall continue to be treatedas a regulation issued under
121 See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising
in Rule 5o6 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No.
69,959,78 Fed. Reg.44,77I (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239 & 242).
122 See 17 C.F.R. § 23o. 5o6(b) (2013).
123 Id. § 230.506(c).
124 The SEC was required by section 2oi(a)(i) of the JOBS Act not only to eliminate the
general solicitation prohibition in Rule 5o6 offerings made solely to accredited investors, but also to
require that issuers "'take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited
investors . .. .'" See Securities Act Release No. 9354, 77 Fed. Reg. at 54,465. In its final rule, the SEC
declined to specify verification methods, opting for a principles-based approach and providing
non--exclusive methods for verifying accredited investor status. See Securities Act Release No. 9415,
Exchange Act Release No. 69,959,78 Fed. Reg. at 44,778.
125 See Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No. 69,959, 78 Fed. Reg. at
44,774.
126 Id.
127 Id. The SEC has recently interpreted Rule So6(c) to preclude "fall back" reliance on
Section 4(a)(2) by issuers who have engaged in general solicitation, stating that "[t]he use of
general solicitation continues to be incompatible with a claim of exemption under Section 4(a)
(2)." Securities Act Rules: Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (C&DFs), Question 26o.i3, U.S.




Section 4[(a)](2) of the Securities Act of 1933.'"128 Section 4(a)(2) thus has an
anomalous statutorily mandated regulatory exception.
E. Rule 506 Disqualifcation Under BadActor Rules
Regulation D has been marred since promulgation with a major and
somewhat inexplicable regulatory incongruity. When promulgated, Regulation
D prohibited issuers from relying on the Rule 505 exemption if they had
certain adverse regulatory histories but allowed issuers relying on the Rule 506
exemption to proceed without regard to those adverse regulatory histories. To
rectify this anomaly, Congress, in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010129 (Dodd-Frank Act), legislated a mandate
to the SEC to amend Rule 506 to disqualf/ securities offerings involving
certain felons and other bad actors, so-called "bad boys," from reliance on
Rule 506.130 Pursuant to that mandate, the SEC proposed amendments to
Rule 506 but delayed adopting final rules for over two years. 3' On the same day
it promulgated Rule 506(c), as discussed above, the SEC adopted disqualifying
provisions in a new Rule 506(d) under Regulation D.13 2 Consequently, an issuer
will not be entitled to rely on either the traditional Rule 506(b) exemption or
its new Rule 506(c) counterpart if the issuer, its affiliates or predecessor issuers,
its executive officers (or other officers participating in the offering), its general
partners or managing members, its major shareholders (20% beneficial owners),
its promoters and those soliciting purchasers for direct or indirect remuneration,
and any director, executive officer, general partner, or managing member of such
solicitors have been subject to certain disqualifing events within prescribed
five and ten year time frames."' These disqualifying events include, among
others, felony and misdemeanor convictions related to securities transactions,
false filings, judicial and administrative orders restraining securities related
conduct or practices, certain state securities, banking and insurance authorities'
final orders, SEC orders suspending or revoking registration, and other orders
delimiting securities related activities. 13 4 Issuers are now required to certfi in
128 JOBS Act, Pub. L. ixz-io6, § 20z(a)(1) 126 Stat. 3o6, 314 (2012) (codified in scattered
sections of I5 U.S.C. (2012) (emphasis added).
129 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of12 &15 U.S.C.).
130 Id. § 926,124 Stat. at 1851.
131 See Disqualification of Felons and Other "Bad Actors"from Rule 5o6 Offerings, Securities
Act Release No. 9211, 76 Fed. Reg. 31,518 (proposed June i, 2o1) (to be codified at 17 C.FR. pts.
230 & 239).
132 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d) (2013); see Disqualification of Felons and Other "Bad Actors"from
Rule 506 Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9414, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,730 (July 24, 203) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230 & 239).
133 17 C.FR. § 230.5 06(d).
134 Id. The SEC has interpreted Rule 5o6(d) to exclude disquaifying events that have
occurred in foreign jurisdictions, including convictions, court orders, injunctions by foreign courts,
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Form D that they are not disqualified from reliance on Rule 506.3' However,
issuers are provided with a reasonable care defense if they can demonstrate that
they actually made factual inquiries into whether disqualifications existed."'6
Moreover, the SEC has provided in Rule 506(d) that the rule will apply only
to disqualifying events that occur after its effective date.' 7 Most significantly,
however, should an issuer conduct an offering while subject to disqualification
under Rule 506(d), it not only loses its Rule 506 exemption but may also become
subject to applicable state registration requirements.' The imposition of "bad
and regulatory orders issued by foreign regulatory authorities. Securities Act Rules: Compliance and
Disclosure Interpretations (C&DI's), Question 260.20, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 4,
2o3), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm.
135 Id.
136 Id. § 230. 5o6(d)(2).While stating that "the concept of reasonable care necessarily includes
inquiry by the issuer into the relevant facts," the SEC chose not to prescribe any specific steps
issuers should take in order to satisfy the rule's reasonable care standard. Disqualification of Felons
and Other "Bad Actors" from Rule So6 Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9414, 78 Fed. Reg. at
44,746. The steps that should be taken, according to the SEC, "will vary according to the particular
facts and circumstances."Id. The SEC has stated that issuers are likely to have in-depth knowledge
of their own officers gained as a result of the hiring process and the employment relationship
and, accordingly, further steps may not be required. Id It added that "[flactual inquiry by means
of questionnaires or certifications, perhaps accompanied by contractual representations, covenants
and undertakings, may be sufficient in some circumstances, particularly if there is no information
or other indicators suggesting bad actor involvement." Id at 44,747. Where the issuers do not have
in-depth knowledge of their own officers and other "covered persons," they would be required
to undertake more extensive factual inquiries. Unfortunately, as the SEC has acknowledged,
"there is no central repository that aggregates information from all the federal and state courts
and regulatory authorities that would be relevant in determining whether covered persons have
a disqualifying event in their past." Id. at 44,746. Most practitioners recognize that the new bad
actor rules impose significant due diligence obligations on issuers and their counsel. For example,
two practitioners recently observed that "in order for a lawyer to issue an opinion that the offering
complies with the new private offering regime, that lawyer will have to conduct a substantial and
costly due diligence."AndrewJ. Rosell & Stas Getmanenko, Reg. D Revamp Could Dampen Growth
Capital Market, LAw 360 (Oct. 30, 2013, 6:25 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/4846Z2/reg-d-
revamp-could-dampen--growth-capital-market.
137 17 C.F.R. § 23 0.5o6(d)(2)(i).The SEC's bad actor rules require issuers to provide written
disclosure of all matters that would have triggered disqualification but for the fact that the
disqualifying events occurred before the effective date of the rules. Id. § 230.506(e). Moreover,
the SEC "expect[s] that issuers will give reasonable prominence to the disclosure to ensure that
information about pre-existing bad actor events is appropriately presented in the total mix of
information available to investors." Disqualification of Felons and Other "Bad Actors" from Rule
So6 Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9414, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,749. If an issuer should fail to
adequately disclose this information to investors, whether accredited or nonaccredited, it would
be precluded from reliance on the Rule 5o6 exemption from registration. See id. According to the
SEC, such a disclosure failure would not be considered an "insignificant deviation" from Rule 5o6
requirements and, consequently, would not be protected by Rule 508 of Regulation D, 57 C.FR.
§ 230.508. See id. at 44,749-50.The SEC stated that "[d]isclosure of pre-existing triggering events
under new Rule 5o6(e) is intended to benefit all investors by alerting them to any bad actors
associated with the issuer or the offering," and, therefore, is a requirement directly intended to
protect offerees and purchasers. See id.
138 Issuers who are ineligible to rely on Rule 5o6 will not be able to claim Rule 5o6's
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boy" rules on Rule 506 issuers creates a pathway for state regulatory authorities
to monitor Rule 506 issuers and their promoters to ensure that they do not have
adverse regulatory histories, providing vital protection to prospective investors.
If any of the participants identified under Rule 506(d) are bad actors, the issuer
may well lose its preemption shield and become fully subject to prosecution for
failure to register its securities, in addition to prosecution for misrepresenting
or omitting to disclose the involvement of bad actors, for misrepresenting the
offering as exempt from registration and for making a false or misleading filing
with the state regulators."' Certainly, Rule 506(d) has been the only "good
news"for state regulators in the wake of the SEC's promulgation of Rule 506(c).
F The ProposedAmendments to Rule 506
The SEC, in the interim between proposing and promulgating Rule 506(c),
received numerous comment letters from NASAA and other investor advocates
strongly urging it to complement the new rule with protective safeguards
intended to ameliorate potential harms to investors that would likely result
from the JOBS Act mandate.'Ihese commentators recommended that the SEC
revise the individual accredited investor wealth based criteria and, at the very
least, factor in inflation over the thirty-year period since those criteria were
set.140'hey also asked the Commission to make an issuer's filing of the Form
preemption benefit and will be subject to the requirements of state securities laws in those states
where they have engaged in the offer or sale of securities. See Disqualification of Felons and Other
"Bad Actors" from Rule 506 Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9414, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,731.
139 Issuers who falsely certify that no bad actors are involved in their offerings, a new
requirement set forth in Form D, have likely made a misrepresentation of a material fact actionable
under both federal and state antifraud provisions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 73-201 (Supp.
2012); 17 C.F.R. § 24 o.iob-5 (2013). Similarly, issuers who falsely represent their offerings to be
exempt from state and federal registration requirements have likely made a misrepresentation of
a material fact, arguably providing the basis for both state and federal enforcement of respective
antifraud regimes and private causes of action for securities fraud. Id.
14o Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule So6 and Rule r44A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9354, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,464, 54,466
(proposed Sept. 5,2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 239); Letter from Paul Schott Stevens,
President & CEO, Inv. Co. Inst., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, Sec. Exch. Comm'n 2,7 (May 21,
2012), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/26174.pdf (recommending an updated accredited investor
definition with higher income and net worth thresholds and the inclusion of a new category of
"accredited natural persons"). The individual accredited investor thresholds promulgated in 1982,
$200,ooo annual income and ssiooo,ooo net worth, had the same buying power when adopted
as $482,812 and $2,414,o62, respectively, had in 2013. See CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB.
STAT., U.S. DEPT LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation-calculator.htm (last visited Mar. 22,
2014). Conversely, in 2013 dollars, the income criterion in 1982 was s82,848 per year and the net
worth criterion was $414,240. See id. Indeed, one commentator specifically recommended that
the accredited investor income and net worth criteria be increased, respectively, from s2oo,ooo
to $400,000, and from si million to $2.5 million. Letter from Mercer Bullard, President, Fund
Democracy, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secy, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, 6 (May 24, 20012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-14.pdf.
2013- 2014] THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE PLACEMENTS
D a condition to use of the Rule 506 exemption,141 to require that the Form D
be filed in advance of the commencement of any Rule 506 offering involving
general solicitation, 142 and to improve the content requirements of the Form D
itself.143'Ihe SEC rejected calls for redefinition of individual accredited investors
based on Dodd-Frank Act restrictions,'" but it did incorporate aspects of the
141 Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 5o6 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9 354 , 77 Fed. Reg. at 54,466; Letter
from Jack Herstein, President, N. Am. Sec. Administrators Ass'n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secy,
Sec. Exch. Comm'n 4(July3,2012), available at http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/20II/07/
Initial-NASAA-Comments-to-SEC-re-JOBS-Act-Rulemaking.pdf (recommending that the
filing of a Form D prior to the use of general solicitation be a requirement of the exemption
because, without such a filing requirement, regulators would "have no way of knowing whether a
promoter is legitimately trying to comply with Rule 506, so a fraudulent offering will be allowed
to continue until the regulators have gathered sufficient evidence to prove fraud has already
occurred"); Letter from Bryan J. Lantagne, Dir., Mass. Sec. Div., to Nancy M. Morris, Sec'y, Sec.
Exch. Comm'n 4 (Sept. 7, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7--2-07/s7l207-ii.pdf
(asking that the Commission "make the filing of a Form D a condition of the availability of the
Regulation D exemptions").
142 See Letter from Mercer Bullard, President, Fund Democracy, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec'y, Sec. Exch. Comm'n (Aug. 16, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/
jobstitleii-6o.pdf; Letter from Jack Herstein to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 141, at 4.
143 See Letter from Jack Herstein to Elizabeth M. Murphy, supra note 141, at 4, 1o (proposing
that advertising materials used in Rule 5o6 offerings should include a "'balanced presentation
of risks and rewards' and a requirement that statements in advertisng are consistent with
representations in the offering documents"); Letter from Andrea L. Seidt, Comm'r, Ohio Div. of
Sec., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, Sec. Exch. Comm'n 3 (July 3, zoz), available at http://www.
sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-38.pdf ("[T]he Commission should consider adopting
a uniform set of required disclosures and content restrictions for general advertising and general
solicitation [materials] . . . . [such as] a required legend disclosing those jurisdictions where the
offering is being made (and disclaiming sales in any others). Financial projections or statements of
future performance should be prohibited.").
144 Section 413(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act required the SEC to amend Rule 3o(a)(5) of
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230-50I(a)(5), to exclude the value of the primary residence in determining
accredited investor status of natural persons based on the si,ooo,ooo minimum net worth criterion.
This provision further stated that,"during the 4-year period that begins on the date of enactment of
this Act, any net worth standard shall be si,ooo,ooo, excluding the value of the primary residence
of such natural person." Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.
L. 111-203, § 413(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (20zo). Section 4 13 (b) of the statute authorized the SEC
to undertake a review of the definition of the term "accredited investor" as it applies to natural
persons, and required the SEC to undertake a review of the definition in its entirety every four
years, beginning four years after the Dodd-Frank Act's enactment. Id. § 413(b), 124 Stat. at 1577-78-
The SEC has taken the position that these provisions have restricted its authority to update or
otherwise modify its regulatory definitions of accredited investors under Regulation D prior to
July lo, 2014. See Net Worth Standards for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9287,
Investment Company Act Release No. 29,891, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,793, 81,795 (Dec. 29, 2011) (to be
codified at 17 C.ER. pts. 230, 239, 270 & 275). After the JOBS Act was enacted, the SEC's General
Counsel and staff have continually interpreted away the SEC's authority to update or otherwise
revise its regulatory definition of "accredited investors." Interview with Barbara Roper, Dir. of
Investor Prot., Consumer Fed'n of Am., in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 29, 2013). However, even by
its own strained interpretation, the SEC's full authority to act reblossoms on July so, 2014. See Net
Worth Standards for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9287, Investment Company
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other suggestions in amendments to Regulation D proposed on the same day
that it adopted its final rule lifting the ban on general solicitation. 145 The SEC
acknowledged that its adoption of Rule 506(c) permitting general solicitation
did carry substantial risks, as expressed by commentators, and that Rule 506(c)
offerings "would attract both accredited and non-accredited investors and
could result in an increase in fraudulent activity in the Rule 506 market, as well
as an increase in unlawful sales of securities to non-accredited investors."146
It agreed that providing additional protections for investors would actually
improve its ability to evaluate the development of the new market for generally
solicited private offerings and to address investor protection concerns.147
Accordingly, instead of incorporating the various suggested safeguards into its
final Rule 506(c), the SEC opted in favor of releasing proposed amendments
for public comments.
The SEC's proposed rules, now awaiting either promulgation or
abandonment, include six basic amendments relating primarily to the new
marketplace for "public" private offerings of securities:
(1) Issuers proposing to sell securities under the Rule 506(c) exemption
would be required to file an "Advance Form D" at least fifteen calendar
days before engaging in general solicitation, an amended Form D within
fifteen days after the first sale, and a closing amendment to that Form D
within thirty days after completion of the offering disclosing the total
amount sold during the offering.148 Unlike the present requirement that
a Form D be filed within fifteen days after the first sale,149 the Advance
Form D would provide regulators a significant opportunity for presale
review. Similar to the presentForm D,the Advance Form D would require
basic identifying information about issuers, the location of its principal
place of businesses, contact persons, related persons, industry groups,
the exemption claimed, whether the filing is new or an amendment,
the types of securities offered, whether the offering relates to a business
combination, sales compensation, and use of proceeds for payments to
affiliates.s 0 After the first sale, issuers would have to file an amendment
containing the remaining information required by Form D with more
Act Release No. 29,891,76 Fed. Reg. at 81,795.
145 Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No. 9416,
Exchange Act Release No. 69,96o, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,595, 78 Fed. Reg.
44,8o6 (proposed July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 23o & 239).
146 Id. at 44,8o7.
147 See id at 44,811.
148 Id. at 44,81o-2.
149 17 C.ER. § 23o.503(a) (2053).
150 See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No.
9416, Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,595, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 44,811.
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expansive content requirements (although this could be obviated by
providing this information in the Advance Form D)."s' In addition,
issuers relying on either Rule 506(b) or Rule 506(c) would be required
to file a final or "closing" amendment within thirty calendar days after
termination of the offering, 152 in effect -reviving a filing requirement
imposed by Regulation D at the time of its original adoption."' 'The
requirement of a closing amendment would be, of course, in addition to
existing provisions of Rule 503154 that require amendments to correct
material misstatements in previously filed Form Ds." The SEC stated
that its proposed reimposition of the closing amendment was now
warranted by the considerable growth of the Regulation D market in
recent years and its own enhanced electronic surveillance capabilities. 5
(2) Acknowledging that Form Ds, as electronically filed with the SEC,
serve as an important source of information for investors and state and
federal regulators, the SEC determined that Form Ds content should be
more expansive.s'5 Under its proposed rule, issuers in Rule 506 offerings
would be required to disclose-among other things-their websites,
controlling persons, more detailed information on use of offering
proceeds, more detailed information on the types of accredited and
non-accredited investors, whether general solicitation materials were
filed with FINRA, information on promoters in pooled investment fund
offerings, the types of general solicitation, and the accredited investor
verification methodology used in Rule 50 6(c) offerings.'s
(3) Issuers in Rule 506 offerings who have failed to comply with Form D
filing requirements at any time within the previous five years would be
automatically disqualified from using Rule 506 in any new offering for a
period of one year, commencing after the filing of all required Form D
filings.s'5 This disqualification is in addition to the present Rule 507
disqualification, applicable to all Regulation D offerings, that arises from
151 Id. at 44,811 & n.45.
152 Id. at 44,812.
153 The requirement of a closing amendment was previously eliminated by the SEC in
1986 on the grounds that the initial Form D filing provided sufficient information for the SEC's
enforcement surveillance. Form D and Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6663,51 Fed. Reg.
36,385 (Oct. so, 1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 239)-
154 17 C.F.R. § 230-503.
155 Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No. 9416,
Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,595, 78 Fed. Reg. at
44,812-13.
156 Id. at 44,813.
157 Id. at 44,814.
158 Id. at 44,815-16.
159 Id. at 44,817-18.
995
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
any injunction against an issuer for violating the filing requirements.'6
The SEC explained in its proposing release that it had considered, but
rejected, restoring the filing of Form Ds as a condition to use of the
exemption on the grounds that is would be too severe a sanction. 16 " The
loss of the exemption, according to the SEC, "would give purchasers
rescission rights and result in the loss of 'blue sky' preemption." 162 In its
view, the one-year disqualification period "should create a significant
incentive to file Form D on a timely basis without unduly burdening
market participants."' 6 1 Moreover, the five-year look-back period
would only apply to non-compliance that occurs after the effective date
of the proposed rule.164 In addition, the proposed rule provides for a
thirty-day cure period to prevent disqualification as a result of
inadvertent technical errors, but it would only apply to the first failure to
timely file the Form D in a particular offering and, accordingly, issuers
would not be permitted to repeatedly rely on the cure period throughout
an offering.165 The proposed rule also would grant the SEC authority to
waive disqualification upon a showing of good cause.16 6
(4) Issuers utilizing the noisy Rule 506(c) would be subject to new
Rule 509 of Regulation D requiring legends in any written general
solicitation materials and additional disclosures for private fund issuers
whose materials include performance data.'16 The mandated legends
include the following:
(a) The securities may be sold only to accredited investors,
which for natural persons, are investors who meet certain
minimum annual income or net worth thresholds;
(b) The securities are being offered in reliance on an
exemption from the registration requirements of the
Securities Act and are not required to comply with specific
disclosure requirements that apply to registration under the
Securities Act;
160 Id. at 44,817.
161 Id. at 44,818.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 44,819.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 44,819-20.
167 Id. at 44,821.
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(c) The Commission has not passed upon the merits of or
given its approval to the securities, the terms of the offering,
or the accuracy or completeness of any offering materials;
(d) The securities are subject to legal restrictions on transfer
and resale and investors should not assume they will be able
to resell their securities; and
(e) Investing in securities involves risk, and investors should
be able to bear the loss of their investment.1 68
The SEC's intent in prescribing these legends is to "better inform
potential investors as to whether they are qualified to participate in Rule
506(c) offerings and certain potential risks that may be associated with
such offerings."'6 The proposed rule would require private fund issuers
to include legends disclosing that
performance data represents past performance; past performance does not
guarantee future results; current performance may be lower or higher than
the performance data presented; the private fun is not required by law to
follow any standard methodology ... and [that performance] may not be
directly comparable to the performance of [other funds].7 0
The proposed rule would also amend Rule 507(a) to render the Rule
506 exemption unavailable to issuers who have been enjoined for
noncompliance with the new Rule 509.171
(5) Rule 156, which provides guidance on the types of information in
investment company sales literature that could be materially misleading
under federal securities antifraud provisions, would be amended to
apply to the sales literature used by private funds, whether or not they
are engaged in general solicitation.'72
(6) New temporary Rule 510T of Regulation D would require that
issuers file, through the SEC's intake page on its website, all written
general solicitation materials prepared by or on behalf of the issuer no
later than the date of first use of these materials. 7 1 These submissions,
which the SEC will require for two years in connection with its
evaluation of market practices in the new Rule 506(c) marketplace, will
not be treated as being "filed" or "furnished" for purposes of the federal
168 Id. at 44,821-22.
169 Id. at 44,822.
170 Id at 44,822-23.
171 Id. at 44,283.
172 Id at 44,825.
173 See id. at 44,828-29.
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securities laws and their liability provisions.17 4 Noncompliance would be
treated similarly as failure to use the proposed mandated legends and,
accordingly, issuers would be precluded from their use of the Rule 506
exemption if subject to an injunction for failure to comply.7s
In addition to the proposed amendments, the SEC has requested comments
on whether the accredited investor definitions of Rule 501, as they relate to
natural persons presently accredited by income and net worth criteria, should
be revised.' 6 As previously noted, the SEC made it's request pursuant to
Section 413(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act requiring the SEC's quadrennial review
of this definition." ' 'That Act also required the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to complete a study, which has been recently released, addressing
alternative criteria for qualifying as an accredited investor."' The SEC has also
requested comments regarding whether, as a condition to use of Rule 506(c),
issuers should be required to provide a formal disclosure document or private
placement memoranda containing specified information to all purchasers prior
to any sales of securities.1'7 Lastly, the SEC has requested comments regarding
whether reporting companies under the 1934 Act should be precluded from use
of the Rule 506(c) exemption if they have not timely filed all required periodic
reports. "'
The SEC, given Congress's mandate in Title II of the JOBS Act to adopt
rules permitting unregistered, generally solicited, private offerings to accredited
investors, had no choice but to adopt Rule 506(c).'Ihe proposed amendments
clearly evidence the SEC's intent to ameliorate the rule's potentially disastrous
impact on individual retail investors. They also reflect serious concerns
expressed by NASAA and other investor protection advocates."' Although
these proposals do not go as far as investor advocates recommended, they would
provide considerable protection and would better enable state and federal
regulators to engage in early stage review of these "public" private offerings.
In promulgating these amendments, the SEC appears to have also been
influenced by the recommendations made by the SEC's Investor Advisory
Committee (IAC), established by Section 911 of the Dodd-Frank Act to advise
174 Id. at 44,828.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 44,829-30.
177 See supra note 144 and accompanying text; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 4 13 (b), 124 Stat. 0376, 1577-78 (200).
178 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 415, 124 Stat. at
1578; GAO ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA, supra note 2o.
179 See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No.
9406, Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, Investment Company Act Release No.30,595,78 Fed. Reg.
44,806,44,830.
18o See id.
181 See id. at 44,807 n.x8.
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the SEC on regulatory priorities, investor protection and market integrity,
among other things.182 Shortly after the SEC proposed Rule 506(c), the IAC
submitted its recommendations to the SEC, setting forth seven proposals both
to improve investor protections and to enhance the abilities of state and federal
regulators to police the new Rule 506(c) marketplace.8 3 Most, but not all, of
the IAC's proposals are reflected either in the SEC's final Rule 506(c) or in the
SEC's proposed amendments. They include the following:
(1) IAC's first recommendation was that the SEC require Rule 506(c)
issuers to file an advance notification, either a new"Form GS"or a revised
Form D, before commencement of an offering and as a precondition
for claiming the exemption.'84 The content of the revised form would
include, among other disclosures, the identities of the issuer's control
persons, lawyers and accountants, the amount to be raised, a description
of the issuer's general solicitation plans, a description of the issuer's
business plans, and use of proceeds.'s This IAC recommendation has
largely been incorporated in the SEC's pending proposed amendments
as Advance Form D.11s
(2) IAC's second recommendation was that the SEC require that Rule
506(c) issuers file, as a condition to claiming the exemption, their general
solicitation materials with the SEC through an online, electronic "drop
box" before first use of that material.' 7 The SEC would use these
submissions to monitor the types of solicitations being used by issuers
and to identify potential fraud.' 8 By making these materials publicly
182 See id.
The [SEC Investor Advisory Committee (IAC)] was established in April 2012 pursuant
to Section 911 of the Dodd-Frank Act to advise the Commission on regulatory
priorities, the regulation of securities products, trading strategies, fee structures, the
effectiveness of disclosure, initiatives to protect investor interests and to promote
investor confidence and the integrity of the securities marketplace. The Dodd-Frank
Act authorizes the [IAC] to submit findings and recommendations for review and
consideration by the Commission.
Id.
183 See INVESTOR ADVISORY COMM., U.S. SEC. & ExcH. Comm'N, RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE REGARDING SEC RULEMAKING To LIFT THE BAN ON
GENERAL SOLICITATION AND ADVERTISING IN RULE 506 OFFERINGS: EFFICIENTLY BALANCING
INVESTOR PROTECTION, CAPITAL FORMATION AND MARKET INTEGRITY (2012) [hereinafter
IAC RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-
committee-2012/iac-general-solicitation-advertising-recommendations.pdf.
184 Id. at 2.
185 Id.
186 See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No.
9416, Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,595,78 Fed. Reg.
4.4,806, 44,810-I2.
187 IAC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 183, at 2.
I88 Id. at 2-3.
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available on a timely basis, the SEC could crowdsource the public's ability
to inform the SEC of potential frauds."' The SEC has proposed a new
Rule 510T requiring issuers to file general solicitation materials for a
two-year evaluation period.190
(3) IAC's third recommendation was that the SEC require that
Rule 506(c) impose clear and enforceable standards for verilcation
of accredited investor status, as opposed to Rule 506(b)'s traditional
"reasonable belief" standard, including standards that would promote
reliance on lawyers, broker-dealers, accountants, and other reliable forms
of third party verification.19' The SEC has, in essence, promulgated this
IAC proposal in its new Rule 506(c). 192
(4) IAC's fourth recommendation was that the SEC require the filing
of Form D as a condition to an issuer's reliance on any Regulation D
exemption, whether under Rules 504, 505, or 506(b) and (c).193 The
IAC noted that "[i]t is generally acknowledged that a significant
number of issuers do not currently file Form D, depriving the
Commission of important information and inhibiting its ability to
provide effective market oversight."' 94 The SEC, for now, has rejected
this recommendation, and has stated in its proposed amendments that
the consequences of adopting the recommendations would be unduly
burdensome. 1 5
(5) IAC's fifth recommendation was that the SEC take steps to ensure
that past performance claims used in general solicitation materials be
based on auditable standards.196 The IAC believed the SEC should
designate the appropriate standards from private sector standards
189 Id.
190 See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No.
9416, Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, Investment Company Act Release No. 3 0,59 5,78 Fed. Reg.
at 44,828-29.
191 See IAC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 183, at 3.
192 See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising
in Rule 506 and Rule i44A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No.
69,959, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,776, 44,778-79 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230,
239 & 242).
193 See IAC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 183, at 3.
194 Id.
195 See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No.
9416, Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, Investment Company Act Release No. 30, 595 , 7 8 Fed. Reg.
at 44,8z8. It should be recognized that absent a mandatory filing requirement, there are insufficient
means for effectively policing the bad actor rule.
196 See IAC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 183, at 4.
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already applied in order to minimize compliance costs.'97 The SEC
has responded in its proposed amendments that it would be sufficient
to disclose that private funds are not required to follow any particular
standards.'"8
(6) IAC's sixth recommendation was that the SEC amend the
definition of accredited investors pertinent to natural persons "to
better reflect a population that has the financial sophistication to
analyze the risks in private offerings." 99 The IAC criticized the reliance
exclusively on wealth and income tests because of their invariance to
an investor's actual financial sophistication.2 00 In its view, adding some
form of purchaser suitability criterion is "essential in the absence of
the procedural protections afforded by the general solicitation and
advertising ban."20' The SEC, in its recent release proposing further
amendments to Rule 506, has requested comments on the present
accreditation criteria.2 02
(7) IAC's seventh recommendation was that the SEC flfill its
congressional mandate under Section 926 of the Dodd-Frank Act by
promulgating a rule disqualifying felons and other "bad actors" from
relying on any Rule 506 exemption, and to do so in conjunction with
the SEC's promulgation of Rule 506(c).203 The SEC clearly agreed with
this recommendation and promulgated new Rule 506(d) disqualifying
provisions on the same day it promulgated Rule 506(c) permitting
generally solicited private offerings. 201
The IAC's recommendations will remain influential as the SEC reviews the
public comments on its proposed amendments to provide additional investor
protections for investors in the context of generally solicited private offerings
under Rule 506(c). In the meantime, however, issuers have been allowed to
197 See id.
198 See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No.
9416, Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,595,78 Fed. Reg.
at 44,822-23.
199 IAC REcOMMENDATIONS, supra note 183, at 4.
2o0 Id.
201 Id.
202 See Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No.
9416, Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,595,78 Fed. Reg.
at 44,829-30. See generally GAO ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA, supra note 20 (explaining why the SEC
should change its accreditation methodologies).
203 See IAC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 183, at 4.
204 17 C.F.R. § 23 O.5 o6(d) (2013); see Disqualification of Felons and Other "Bad Actors"
from Rule 5o6 Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9414,78 Fed. Reg. 44,730 (July 24, 2013) (to be
codified at 17 C.ER. ptS. 200, 230 & 239)-
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proceed with offerings that do not have these additional protections. Based
on my review of public comments to date and discussions with regulators and
others close to the process, I am certain that the SEC's proposed amendments
will not enjoy clear sailing to adoption. Rule 506(c) offerings may well proceed
for a considerable period of time before any additional protections are afforded
to investors. For now, state regulatory authorities are forced to cope with the
regulatory playing field as it is. In the following section of this Article I suggest
several approaches the states should consider in their continuing efforts to
fulill their mission.
II. THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN REGULATING RULE 506 OFFERINGS
The regulatory context for private offerings of securities has radically
evolved from an initial context in which state legislatures had the option to
provide presale review of securities offerings through registration and exemptive
schemes that were complemented by investor protection safeguards. In this
initial context, states could also engage in post-sale enforcement against those
who participated in fraudulent offerings. Ihe SEC, at the federal level, had
no regulatory discretion with respect to the registration option since Congress
exempted private offering transactions from registration before the SEC was
even established.2 05 The SEC could, of course, create a Section 4(a)(2) regulatory
safe harbor, which it did in 1982 with its promulgation of Rule 506. In doing
so, it positioned itself to provide presale review, at least theoretically, because
Rule 506 has always set forth substantive restraints on issuers that would rely on
the exemption, including imposition of a Form D filing requirement. However,
as a matter of practice, the SEC has elected not to monitor Form D filings with
respect to any of the Regulation D exemptions or to otherwise spot check these
offerings to ensure compliance with the substantive conditions of Rule 506.206
Moreover, the SEC, as a matter of practice, has not for the most part focused
its enforcement efforts on private offerings in general, including those under
Rule 506 but, instead, has tended to pursue grander, more noteworthy targets.
Its chosen path is obviously consistent with its role as the nation's central
authority over national securities markets, enforcing the federal securities laws
against celebrities and other high profile individuals, like Martha Stewart0"
and Mark Cuban,2 08 for prophylactic effect, and rarely pursuing the issuers and
205 See Securities Act of 933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77 d(a)(2) (2012).
206 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXcH. COMM'N, REP. No. 4 59, REGULATION
D EXEMPTION PROCESS 8 (2009) [hereinafter OIG REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/offices/oig/reports/audits/soo9/459.pdf.
207 See generally Joan MacLeod Herninway, Martha Stewart and the Forbidden Fruit: A New
Story ofEve, 2009 MIcH. ST. L. REv. 017, 1024-25; Donald C. Langevoort, Reflections on Scienter
(and the Securities Fraud Case Against Martha Stewart that Never Happened), so LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. I, 2 (2oo6); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case ofMartha Stewart, 26
CARDOzo L. REV. 2023, 2025 (2005)-
208 See Complaint at 1-2, SEC v. Cuban, 634 F Supp. 2d 7x3 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (No. 3:08-
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promoters of private offerings far off its regulatory radar screen. Unlike state
securities regulators, the SEC's enforcement personnel have never assumed
roles as local cops on the beat in American communities.
The states, in exercising their regulatory options, have generally determined
not to provide presale review through registration of offerings exempt from
federal registration under Section 4(a)(2) or Regulation D, as historically
demonstrated by their state level private offering exemptions and by their
successful efforts in coordinating those exemptions with the federal exemptive
scheme. Most states have adopted NASAAs Uniform Limited Offering
Exemption (ULOE), exempting private offerings from their own registration
schemes if those offerings are compliant with the collective requirements of
Regulation D and certain additional conditions.209 According to two prominent
securities scholars, this has "eliminate[ed] duplicative regulation of small issuers
at the state level."2 10
The states, rather than effecting regulation through registration, embarked
instead on providing presale review by monitoring their own exemptive schemes
to ensure compliance by issuers from the earliest stages of their offerings.
When, as a result of NSMIA, issuers began routing virtually all of their private
offerings through Rule 506, this option was severely curtailed. Since 1996, the
states can no longer coordinate or structure their own exemptive schemes to
impose qualitative restrictions on issuers, including bad actor disqualification,
investor suitability criteria, additional disclosures, or any other measures for
the protection of investors. As previously discussed, the states were positioned
only to review Form D notice filings, which provide limited content for review,
assuming issuers actually filed them at all. Even then, Rule 506 required only
that those notices be filed with the SEC within two weeks of the first sale of
securities anywhere and, under most state schemes, within two weeks after the
first sale in their respective states. In addition to monitoring these Form Ds,
states were positioned to monitor local media and other communications and
issue ease and desist orders where general solicitation was found since before
implementation of Title II of the JOBS Act, any general solicitation voided
the Rule 506 exemption and its preemptive effect.21' Now that the SEC has
CV-zo 5 o-D), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp2o8io.pdf. After
a three-week trial before a federal jury in Dallas, Texas, Cuban was found not guilty of insider
trading. See Cuban, Litigation Release No. 22,855, 2013 WL 5741341 (Oct. 23, 2013); see also Dina
ElBoghdady, Dallas Billionaire Mark Cuban Cleared of Insider Trading Charges, WASH. POST (Oct.
16, 2013), http://washingtonpost.com/business/economy/dallas-bilhionaire-mark-cuban-cleared-
of-insider-trading-charges/2013/Io/16/iogfbea 4- 3 6ao-e 3-8c6- 7e6dd8d22d8fistory.html.
209 See Mark A. Sargent & Hugh H. Makens, ULOE: New Hope, New Challenge, 45 Bus.
LAW. 1319, 1320 & n.9 (1990).
210 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 352 (12th ed. 2012).
211 According to Hugh H. Makens, a prominent securities lawyer and former state regulator,
"the easiest way to lose the Rule 506 preemption is to conduct general advertising or solicitation."
Hugh H. Makens, Blue Sky Practice - Part i: Doing It Right: Avoiding Liability Arising from State
Private Offerings under Uloe and Limited Offering Exemptions, SLo 75 A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of
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promulgated Rule 506(c), general solicitation no longer triggers failure to
register violations under state law. According to one regulator, those fairly easy
cease and desist orders will no longer be available: "Our enforcement tools are
taken away at the very time the target audience, including the likely victims, has
been vastly expanded."212 State regulators, as the only governmental gatekeepers
on the scene, have been severely restrained.
Gatekeepers in the private sector, particularly reputable securities lawyers
and broker-dealers, may have also been marginalized. Securities firms who
regularly represent both established and startup issuers in conducting private
offerings generally do not engage in private offerings directed at non-accredited
investors.213 Similarly, these lawyers have shown little receptivity to generally
solicited offerings to accredited investors.2 14 First, most securities lawyers believe
it is not beneficial to their clients' interests to recruit anonymous accredited
investors through general solicitation or otherwise.215 Indeed, most securities
lawyers tend to be very cautious about investors who may have the money but
have little experience in making money and losing money in private equity
deals. 216 Clearly, the "previously existing substantive relationship" requirement
that has been at the regulatory core of the general solicitation conundrum also
is a vital factor for most startup businesses in assessing which investors will
be appropriate owners of the new enterprises.2 17 Second, because of sticker
shock over the legal fees attendant to bonafide private placements, potential
clients-not infrequently-decide on do-it-yourself offerings at venture capital
clubs and other locales. 218 Third, securities lawyers are known to diligently
screen their clients to eliminate those with adverse histories, independent of
bad actor rules and due diligence obligations, as a matter of risk management
responsibility to their firms.219 Legitimate issuers, having been thoroughly vetted
by their securities counsel, often have access to established local accredited
investors who are unlikely to be problematic owners regardless of whether the
venture fails to meet expectations. Consequently, many issuers who determine
to generally solicit anonymous accredited investors through various media will
not retain competent securities counsel. Accordingly, lawyers, as gatekeepers,
Study 549, 560 (2oo6).
212 See Interview with Chad Harlan, Certified Fin. Insts. Exam'r, Sec. Div., Ky. Dep't. of Fin.
Insts., Harlan, Ky. (Sept. 18, 2013).
213 See Interview with Rick G. Alsip, Partner, Wyatt Tarrant & Combs, Louisville, Ky. (Sept.
19, 2013); Interview with Carolyn L. Duncan, Partner, Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas &
O'Neal, LLP, Birmingham, Ala. (Sept. 10, 2013).
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may not be there to filter a large proportion of the Rule 506(c) offerings to
come.
Broker-dealers are even more unlikely participants in the coming wave of
generally solicited private offerings. According to a recent study, only 13% of all
Regulation D offerings involved financial intermediaries and a large portion of
those were real estate issuers. 2 0 Moreover, during the past three years, FINRA
has become incensed at firms in the securities industry that have only paid lip
service to FINRA's suitability2' and "know your customer" rules.222 FINRA
warned broker-dealers over three years ago that failure to comport with these
obligations could constitute not only a violation of FINRA rules but also a
violation of state and federal securities antifraud provisions. 223 In addition,
FINRA in late 2012 adopted Rule 5123, which requires broker-dealers to file
copies of any private placement memoranda, term sheets, and other offering
documents used in exempt private offerings of securities. 224 FINRA has
recently augmented Rule 5123 by imposing an updated Private Placement
Form that must be filed with FINRA in connection with firms'participation in
private placements. 25 Clearly, FINRA has become intolerant of abuse in this
area in the wake of several significant scandals. 226 Broker-dealer firms have long
shied away from engagement in small scale private offerings, if only because
the revenue to be derived from their participation was disproportionately
low relative to the due diligence costs involved. Now, under intense FINRA
scrutiny, it is even less likely that reputable broker-dealers will be involved in
the vast majority of Rule 506(c) offerings now on the horizon. To some degree,
220 DERA 2013 STUDY, supra note 82, at 16.
221 See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA RULES R. 2111, in FINRA MANUAL (Wolters Kluwer
2014), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid=240 3 &element
id=9 859 (explaining that firms and associated persons have a reasonable basis to believe that a
recommended security action is suitable for a customer).
222 See FIN. INDUs. REG. AUTH., FINRA RULES R. 2090, in FINRA MANUAL, Supra note
221, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid=2403&element
id=9 85 8 (requiring "reasonable diligence" in knowing "essential facts concerning every customer").
223 See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 10-22, OBLIGATION OF BROKER-
DEALERS TO CONDUCT REASONABLE INVESTIGATIONS IN REGULATION D OFFERINGS I (2010),
available at http://finra.complinet.com/net file_store/newrulebooks/f/i/finra-Io-22.pdf.
224 See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 12-40, SEC APPROVES NEw FINRA
RULE 5123 REGARDING PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF SECURITIES I (2012), available at http://finra.
complinet.com/net-file-store/new-rulebooks/f/i/FINRANoticer2_ 4 o.pdf.
225 See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.;
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change Relating to Members'
Filing Obligations Under FINRA Rule 5123 (Private Placement of Securities), Exchange Act
Release No. 69,843, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,367 (July 1, 2013).
226 See News Release, Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., FINRA Sanctions Eight Firms and to
Individuals for Selling Interests in Troubled Private Placements, Including Medical Capital,
Provident Royalties and DBSI, Without Conducting a Reasonable Investigation (Nov. 29, 2011),
available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/20II/Pl23 I93.
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regulatory scrutiny may have served, ironically, to sideline broker-dealers as
gatekeepers in the new marketplace for generally solicited private offerings.
Consequently, state regulators are likely 'to bear the laboring oar in the
protection of investors and their private offering marketplace. NASAA and
other investor advocacy groups were unable to secure repeal of NSMIA's
inclusion of Rule 506 securities as covered securities in the Dodd-Frank Act.227
They were equally unsuccessful in trying to prevent the mutation of the
Rule 506 exemption into both a public and private offering exemption as a
result of the JOBS Act.2 28 At this point in the course of events one can only hope
against hope that investor advocates will prevail in securing adoption of the
SEC's proposed amendments to Regulation D. Certainly, the state regulators'
missions would be.facilitated by adoption of the Advance Form D, requiring
presale filings with the SEC and the states before generally solicited offerings
under Rule 506(c) are commenced, and by adoption of enhanced Form D
content requirements. In my view, it is highly unlikely that proposed Rule 510T
(temporarily requiring filing of written general solicitation materials with the
SEC) or the proposed prescription of mandatory legends will survive the
regulatory process. NASAA and state regulatory agencies, despite only glimmers
of hope, should continue to vigorously support the IAC recommendations and
the SEC's proposed amendments. Regardless of whether those efforts succeed
partially or not at all, NASAA and the states should continuously pursue a
number of regulatory goals and strategies. Until they are better politically
positioned to secure an improved state and federal regulatory structure, one
that better allocates state and federal regulatory competencies and interests,
state regulators should dedicate themselves to early stage enforcement of both
Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c) federal regulatory requirements, as amplified by
the SEC's adoption of Rule 506(d)'s bad actor disqualification provisions. 2 9
227 NASAA "vigorously campaigned" for provisions that would repeal section 8(b)( 4)(D)
of the 1933 Act, as added by NSMIA, which designated securities offered under the Rule 506
exemption as "covered securities," and, accordingly, free of any presale review by state securities
regulators. See Alan M. Parness, From the Chair - Random Rants and Raves, BLUE SKY BUGLE
(ABA Section of Bus. Law, Chi., Ill.), Apr. 2011, at I, 1-2, available at apps.americanbar.org/
buslaw/committees/CL68oooopub/newsletter/2olo4/sozo4.pdf State regulators enthusiastically
supported later stripped provisions in Section 928 of the proposed Dodd-Frank Act which would
have reinstated the presale authority of state regulators over Rule 5o6 offerings. See Current
Investigations into the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the US. Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm'n, ist Public
Hearing 19 (Jan. 14,2010) (statement of Denise Voight Crawford, Comm'r, Texas Securities Board,
President, N. Am. Sec. Administrators Ass'n), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn
media/fcic-testimony/201o-orr4-Crawford.pdf Their efforts were premised largely on the "steady
and significant rise in the number of offerings made pursuant to Rule 5o6 that are later discovered
to be fraudulent."Id. at 8.
228 Gary J. Simon et al., SEC Amends Rule 506 to Permit General Solicitation in Securities
Oferings, MONDAQ (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/26486o/Securities/SE
C+Amends+Rule+5o6+To+Permit+General+Solicitation+In+Securities+Offerings.
229 See generally ENFORCEMENT SECTION, N. Am. SEC. ADMINISTRATORs Ass'N,
NASAA ENFORCEMENT REPORT II (2012), available at http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/
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Despite the severe federal statutory and regulatory handicaps that Congress
has imposed on the states, their securities regulatory authorities have developed
a remarkable record in addressing financial misconduct in their respective
jurisdictions. In its 2012 Enforcement Report, NASAA reported that state
securities regulators conducted over 6121 investigations in 2011, resulting in
2602 criminal, administrative, and civil enforcement actions, and 1662 years
of prison time for convicted perpetrators of securities law violations.230 State
securities authorities levied fines and penalties of $290 million and their
enforcement actions resulted in more than $2.2 billion in investor restitution
orders.231 The vast majority of investment fraud cases involved unregistered
individuals offering and selling unregistered securities in private placements,
with abusive Rule 506 offerings being the most reported financial misconduct.23 2
The report demonstrates that "[i]nvestors continue to rely upon state securities
regulators." 233 According to Commissionr Abshure, this reliance is, "if for no
other reason, because no other regulator is going to act to protect hometown
investors." 23 4
These achievements, however noteworthy, have taken place in a
securities marketplace that was limited to offerings that could not be widely
publicized under the quiet Rule 506(b). State securities regulators have no
experience with the new marketplace that has begun to evolve following
the SEC's implementation of Title II of the JOBS Act. Securities offerings
that are compliant or noncompliant with noisy Rule 506(c), fraudulent and
non-fraudulent, are about to emanate from all over the world, from the bogus
oil and gas operator in a small corner of Tennessee, to Internet boiler rooms
rented in the Ukraine. These offerings will target as offerees, accredited and
non-accredited alike, the entire populations of the respective states. Obviously,
state regulation of these purportedly exempt offerings will evolve, to a large
extent, by trial and error. No one is really positioned to prophesy. In the next
section of this Article, I offer only a few suggestions as next steps the states
might consider in the evolution of their regulatory schemes to protect their
investors from the onslaught now underway.
uploads/2oiz/o/2ot-Enforcement-Report-on-2ot-Data.pdf (explaining state enforcement
efforts targeting securities violations).
230 Id. at 3.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 3, II.
233 Id. at 5.
234 A. Heath Abshure, Comm'r, Ark. Sec. Comm'r, 2012 NASAA Presidential Address at




III. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATES IN
REGULATING RULE 506 OFFERINGS
State regulatory authorities, with the advent of Rule 506(c)'s exemption
for publicly offered private placements, will be more challenged than ever as
they undertake their mission to protect local investors in a drastically enlarged
marketplace. As I have suggested previously, state regulators should first
position themselves as the primary governmental agencies for the enforcement
of Rule 506's regulatory restraints, as set forth in the dual Rule 506 exemptions,
and as the primary antifraud task forces in the fight against fraudulent
private offerings.235 This will require a more universal and uniform review of
the Form Ds filed by issuers in Rule 506 offerings, including the thoughtful
development of Form D review guidelines. They should augment their mission
through implementation of NASAA's long-envisioned Electronic Form D
Depository, as I have previously suggested.23 6 Last, NASAA should consider
the development of a centralized "bad actor" database (BAD) to provide
accessible information about the adverse regulatory histories of issuers and
their promoters, thereby providing a "best practices" mechanism for the factual
inquiry necessary to avoid disqualification of Rule 506 private offerings. 237
These recommendations, even assuming their implementation, will hardly fill
the regulatory gap that leaves both quiet and noisy Rule 506 private offerings
largely unregulated, particularly in their early stages, but they may present a
constructive starting point from which the states can move forward.
A. Enhanced Scrutiny ofRule 506 Offerings
Many states are already engaged in a fairly thorough review of the Form D
notices that are filed in their respective jurisdictions. Other states apparently
235 See Warren, Reallocation, supra note 35, at 507-12.
236 See id. at 510-n (recommending, almost fifteen years ago, that the states develop a web-
based central notification depository for Form Ds, available to both regulators and the investors
they protect); see also infra Part Ill.B.
237 See infra notes 300-20 and accompanying text. As the SEC has acknowledged, a bad actor
database that correlates to the covered persons and disqualifying events prescribed in Rule 5o6(d)
does not exist. See Disqualification of Felons and Other "Bad Actors" from Rule 5o6 Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 9414, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,730 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at V7 C.ER.
pts. 200, 230 & 239). Issuers and their counsel, in the absence of a comprehensive database that
actually covers the various data points established by the rule, will be hard pressed to demonstrate
their reasonable belief that no bad actors are involved in their offerings. If due diligence regarding
the required bad actor certification is simply impossible because no rationally related search can be
done, then they will be equally hard pressed to prove "reasonable care."Their "factual inquiries" are
likely to take the form of self-certification through bad actor "disqualification event"questionnaires,
hardly comporting with professional standards of objective due diligence. Rule So6(d), as it stands,
asks issuers and their counsel to embark on an impossible task. See id at 44,733, 44,746, 44,750. The
essential functioning of the rule and fulfillment of its underlying regulatory policy requires the
development of a comprehensive and continuously updated bad actor database.
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are not so engaged, presumably because of the preemptive aura that surrounds
Rule 506 covered securities. As I have previously concluded, however, NSMIA
perceptions are not necessarily NSMIA reality.238 As amended by NSMIA,
Section 18(a) of the 1933 Act prohibits the states from requiring registration
of Rule 506 covered securities, from adding their own conditions on offering
documents, and from imposing merit-based standards.2 39  Neither this
provision nor any other in the 1933 Act restricts the states from making their
own determinations, based on their independent review of Form Ds or through
the exercise of their general investigatory powers, as to whether a purported
Rule 506 offering is actually compliant with the applicable restrictions in
Regulation D. If it is not, then the nominal Rule 506 offering may not be a
lawfully exempt offering under Rule 506, and thus the securities offered would
not be covered securities and the states would not be proscribed from applying
their own registration and exemptive schemes. Should a state determine that
a given private offering, although labeled a Rule 506 offering by the issuer, is
not compliant, then the burden falls on the issuer to prove that it is. 'The vast
majority of judicial decisions have held that an issuer's merely purporting to
rely on Rule 506 does not result in the preemption of state law. As the Alabama
Supreme Court held in Buist v. Time Domain Corp.,240 the issuer of the subject
securities always has the burden of proof on both the affirmative defense of
preemption and on any claims of exemption from state and federal registration
238 See Warren, Essay on Rule5o6, supra note 25, at 14.
239 Section a8(a) of the 1933 Act provides:
SCOPE OF EXEMPTION - Except as otherwise provided in this section, no law, rule,
regulation, or order or other administrative action of any State or any political
subdivision thereof-
(I) requiring, or with respect to, registration or qualification of securities, or registration
or qualification of securities transactions, shall directly or indirectly apply to a security
that-
(A) is a covered security; or
(B) will be a covered security upon completion of the transaction;
(2) shall directly or indirectly prohibit, limit, or impose any conditions upon the use of-
(A) with respect to a covered security described in subsection (b), any
offering document that is prepared by or on behalf of the issuer; or
(B) any proxy statement, report to shareholders, or other disclosure document
relating to a covered security or the issuer thereof that is required to be and
is filed with the Commission or any national securities organization registered
under section i5A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, except tat this
subparagraph does not apply to the laws, rules, regulations, or orders, or other
administrative actions of the State of incorporation of the issuer; or
(3) shall directly or indirectly prohibit, limit, or impose conditions, based on the merits
of such offering or issuer, upon the offer or sale of any security described in paragraph
Wa.
Securities Act of 1933 § i8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2012).
240 Buist v.Time Domain Corp., 926 So. 2d 290 (Ala. 2005).
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requirements.2 41 The terms "preemption" and "exemption" are, in the court's
words, "functionally equivalent."242 The Sixth Circuit in Brown v. Earthboard
Sports USA, Inc. 243 has observed that "[n]owhere does the statute indicate that a
security may satisfy the definition [of a covered security] if it is sold pursuant to
a putative exemption."244 The court explained that "[i]f Congress had intended
that an offeror's representation of exemption should suffice it could have said so,
but it did not," adding that it was unnecessary to look to the legislative history
of NSMIA since "[t]he statute is unambiguous."2 45 In making their assessments
of Rule 506 compliance, the states actually would be complementing Congress's
exemptive scheme by monitoring and ensuring compliance.'Ihese efforts would
actually achieve the regulatory uniformity that drove Congress to enact NSMIA
in the first place. 246 In other words, issuers only have to comply with one set of
directions rather than inconsistent directions from the various states.2 47 State
review of an issuer's compliance with federal law is not an additional level of
regulation.
Indeed, Section 18(b)(4)(E),2 48 in designating Rule 506 offerings as covered
securities, invites the states to impose substantially the same notice requirements
as the Form Ds required to be filed with the SEC under Regulation D. This
authorization is reiterated in Section 18(c)(2), which provides that state
securities regulatory authorities may require the filing of any document
filed with the SEC, together with annual or periodic reports of the value of
securities offered or sold to persons located in their respective jurisdictions,
for notice purposes, assessment of filing fees, and securing the issuer's consent
to service of process.249 This provision is followed by Section 18(c)(3) which
specifically preserves the power of the states to suspend any offer or sale of
securities whenever this required filing (and payment of attendant fees) is
241 Id. at 296.
242 Id.
243 Brown v. Earthboard Sports USA, Inc. 481 F3d 90 (6th Cir. 2007).
244 Id. at 91x (emphasis added) (quoting Grubka v. WebAccess Int'l, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259,
1269-71 (D. Colo. 2oo6)).
245 Id.
246 One of the most important objectives Congress sought to achieve by its enactment of
NSMIA was "to make securities laws more uniform with the historic mission of state blue sky
laws to protect investors." Robert N. Rapp & Fritz E. Berckmueller, Testing the Limits ofNSMIA
Preemption: State Authority to Determine the Validity of Covered Securities and to Regulate Disclosure,
63 Bus. LAw. 809, 815 (2oo8).
247 The states' enforcement of the SEC's Rule 5o6 exemptive scheme resolves the
inconsistencies and avoids the "societal nervous breakdown" that American federalism has been
said to portend. See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 489 ('954) (discussing these alleged consequences that result from having two
conflicting sets of laws at the State and federal levels).
248 Securities Act of 1933 § i8(b)( 4 )(E), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(E) (2012).
249 Id. § x8(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77 r(c)(2)(A).
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not made.250 In addition, Section 18(c)(1) specifically preserves the powers of
the states to "investigate and bring enforcement actions in connection with
securities or securities transactions with respect to fraud or deceit,"25 1 and,
presumably, to enforce their own registration and exemptive schemes where
nominally Rule 506 covered securities have been uncovered or disrobed as a
result of their investigations. Clearly nothing in the 1933 Act prohibits the
states from thoroughly scrutinizing the Form Ds that are filed with them to
assess compliance with Rule 506, to determine whether their registration and
exemptive schemes are applicable or preempted, and to ascertain whether the
offering would work a fraud on investors. Moreover, in addition to granting
state courts concurrent jurisdiction of all suits in equity and actions at law
to enforce all liabilities and duties created by the statute,252 the 1933 Act
specifically states that despite its general limitations on class actions involving
covered securities, the states are not precluded from bringing their own actions
involving covered securities. 25 3 Vigorous scrutiny by the states helps fill the
regulatory gap by ensuring that the SEC's Rule 506 exemptive scheme does
not fall prey to abusive issuers, thereby diminishing investor confidence in the
private offering marketplace.
The states have multiple investigatory powers and enforcement
methodologies available to them in ferreting out securities offerings that have
not been registered but should have been and offerings that are fraught with
fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions. In coordination with Sections
18(c)(2) and (c)(3) of the 1933 Act, the Uniform Securities Act of 1956,254
enacted in whole or in part by some two-thirds of the states,255 specifically
authorizes state administrators to require that Rule 506 issuers file the SEC's
Form D and a consent to service of process with their offices, and permits state
administrators to issue stop orders suspending the offer and sale of securities
for those issuers' failure to comply.256 In addition, the Uniform Securities Act
makes it unlawful to file any document, including a Form D, that is false or
misleading in any material respect.257 Certainly, issuers who falsely claim a
Rule 506 exemption or otherwise make material misrepresentations in their
Form Ds filed with the states are engaged in conduct that is unlawful under
this provision. The states are authorized under the Uniform Securities Act to
250 Id. § 18(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(3).
251 Id. § x8(c)(r)(a)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7r(c)(x)(A)(i).
252 Id. § 22(a), IS U.S.C. § 77v(a).
253 Id. § z6(d)(2)(A),1 5 U.S.C. § 77 p(d)(2)(A).
254 UNIF. SEC. Acr (amended 1958), 7C U.L.A. 74 5 app.I (2006).
255 See UNIF. SEC. ACT (2002), prefatory note, 7C U.L.A. 2 (20o6) ("The Uniform Securities
Act of 1956 ('1956 Act') has been adopted at one time or another, in whole or in part, by 37
jurisdictions.").
256 UNIF. SEC. ACT (amended 1958) § 3 02(b), 7 C U.L.A. 803 app.I (2006); see also UNIF. SEC.
ACT (2002), § 302(C), 7 C U.L.A 75 (2006).
257 Id. § 4 04 , 7C U.L.A. 865 app.I.
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issue cease and desist orders, to bring injunctive actions, and to seek criminal
penalties, including fines and imprisonment, for violations of this and other
provisions of their statutes, rules, and orders.258
State review of Form Ds, despite their limited content, is certainly a
useful starting point for assessing both the applicability of the Rule 506
preemption exemption and the probabilities of registration and antifraud
violations. The present content requirements are essentially those identified
previously in my discussion of the proposed Advance Form D,259 content that
would be significantly augmented by additional content requirements for the
required subsequent filing fifteen days after the first sale, as provided in the
SEC's proposed amendments. 260 The Form D, as it stands, is roughly four
pages long and poses sixteen questions, and the SEC's rules do not presently
require that Form Ds be accompanied by disclosure documents, or, in the
case of Rule 506(c) offerings, any written general solicitation materials used
by issuers.26 1 Nevertheless, the Form D does serve to apprise state regulatory
authorities that securities offerings are being conducted in their respective
jurisdictions. It also provides, through an issuer's responses to those sixteen
questions, a rudimentary basis for analysis. The SEC's Office of Inspector
General has recognized that the information about private offerings required
in Form D assists both state regulators and FINRA in the enforcement of both
securities laws and financial industry rules, respectively.2 62 Indeed, the SEC, in
its recently proposed amendments to Regulation D and Form D, reiterated its
belief that its "proposed changes to the filing and information requirements of
Form D could assist the enforcement efforts of both federal and state regulators,
which rely on Form D as an important source of information about the private
offering market."2 63 It also affirmed that, historically, Form D has served as
a source of information for investors and facilitated the enforcement efforts
of state securities regulators.2 " The SEC specifically acknowledged comments
that "state securities regulators routinely review Form D filings to ensure that
the offerings actually qualify for an exemption under Rule 506 and to look
for 'red flags' that may indicate that an offering may be fraudulent."2 65 As one
prominent state regulator recently observed, "[t]he states have a particular
258 See id. §§ 408-4o9, 7C U.L.A. 87o-73 app.I.
259 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
260 See supra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
261 See Form D, 17 C.F.R. § 239-500 (2013); see also SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, FORM D: NOTICE
OF EXEMPT OFFERING OF SECURITIES, available at https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
262 OIG REPORT, supra note 2o6, at 5.
263 Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule r56, Securities Act Release No. 9416,
Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,595, 78 Fed. Reg.
44,8o6, 44,8o8 (proposed July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 239).
264 Id. at 44,8io.
265 Id. at 44,811.
1012 [ Vol. 102
2013- 20141 THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE PLACEMENTS
interest in Form D filings because they serve as a window into an otherwise
opaque or invisible market for securities."266
To the extent state regulators feel constrained in their review of Form Ds
because of the status of Rule 506 offerings as covered securities, they should not
be. The purposes of Form D include not only the collection of statistical data
but also the enforcement of both state and federal securities laws.2 67 In the new
world of publicly offered private offerings of covered securities, the states must
unite in their efforts to disrobe securities that do not deserve to be covered.
Issuers that claim their offerings are covered when they patently are not deserve
to be prosecuted for violations of both registration and antifraud provisions of
state securities laws. NASAA could constructively enhance the enforcement
efforts of the states by adopting a policy statement urging all the states to engage
in the systematic review of Form D filings under Rules 506(b) and 506(c).
It should also develop, in consultation with its member states, uniform Form
D review guidelines. These guidelines would serve to streamline the review
process to better ensure consistency and efficiency among state regulatory
authorities in screening Form Ds to detect failures to comply with the strictures
of Rules 506(b), 506(c), and 506(d), to enforce violations of state registration
and exemptive scheme requirements, and to detect and enforce state antifraud
rules. Any review guidelines should be structured to identify and flag for further
inquiry of only those offerings most likely to be problematic and not to nitpick
reputable issuers, promoters, and securities counsel. The underlying policy
should be the protection of retail investors through early stage detection of
those offerings most likely to be abusive. Admittedly limited by my lack of
state regulatory and enforcement experience, I have developed a rudimentary
first draft, set forth below, for consideration by NASAA and state securities
regulatory authorities.
Uniform Form D Review Guidelines
(1) Review the issuer's state of formation and verify whether
it has, in fact, been formed as represented, and whether it is
in good standing under the law of the state of formation. If
not, the offering should be flagged for further review. (Form
D, Item 1).
(2) Review the issuer's date of formation, and, if not yet
formed, the offering should be flagged for further review,
266 Letter from William Francis Galvin, Sec'y, Commonwealth of Mass., to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec'y, Sec. Exch. Comm'n 3 (Sept. 23, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/
s7-o6-i3/s7o6z3-394.pdf.
267 Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No. 9416,




since securities are being offered by a nonexistent issuer.
(Form D, Item 1).
(3) Review the issuer's type of business, and, if engaged in
a business commonly associated with fraudulent conduct,
the offering should be flagged for further review. (Form D,
Item 1 and Item 4).
(4) Conduct a bad actor review for the issuer and related
persons, including the issuer's officers, directors, partners,
managing members and promoters. Ifbad actors are identified,
the offering, pursuant to Rule 506(d), would not be exempt
under Rule 506(b) or (c), and the state may no longer be
preempted from enforcing its own regulatory requirements.
Moreover, if the issuer is disqualified from reliance on Rule
506, consider whether the issuer may have misrepresented
to offerees that its offering is exempt from state and federal
registration, which would be materially misleading. Note,
Form D now requires issuer certiflcation that no bad actors
are associated with offerings under Rule 506. The issuer also
may not have disclosed these adverse regulatory histories to
offerees, which would constitute a material misrepresentation
or omission. (Form D, Item 1 and Item 3).
(5) Conduct both registration and bad actor reviews of all
recipients of sales compensation. If those engaged in selling
the securities are not registered as broker-dealers or are not
clearly exempt, the offering should be flagged for further
review. Note that many abusive offerings often involve
unregistered investment finders. In addition, if bad actors are
identified, the issuer would not be eligible to rely on Rule
506(b) or (c), and the state may no longer be preempted
from enforcing its own regulatory requirements. In addition,
consider whether the issuer may have misrepresented to
offerees that its offering is exempt from state and federal
registration, which would be materially misleading. Again,
Form D requires issuer certification that no bad actors are
associated with offerings under Rule 506. If the issuer has
not disclosed adverse regulatory histories to offerees, it is
likely to have made material misrepresentations or omissions
to investors. (Form D, Items 12 and 15).
(6) Review the number of non-accredited investors in
the offering, and, if any, the offering should be flagged for
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further review since experienced securities lawyers routinely
discourage private offerings to non-accredited investors,
and, consequently, there may be no lawyer acting as a
gatekeeper, thereby increasing investor risks. If the number
of non-accredited investors exceeds 35, the offering may
not qualify for the Rule 506(b) exemption. If there are any
non-accredited investors, the offering does not qualify for
the Rule 506(c) exemption. If the exemption is unavailable,
the state is no longer preempted from enforcement of its
own registration and exemptive requirements. Moreover, the
issuer has likely misrepresented to offerees that its offering is
exempt from state and federal registration, which would be
materially misleading. (Form D, Item 14).
(7) Review the required minimum investment in the offering,
and, if less than $10,000, the offering should be flagged for
further review since reputable securities lawyers rarely assist
issuers in private offerings requiring no or relatively small
minimum investments. (Form D, Item 11).
(8) Review use of proceeds to determine whether substantial
portions of the offering proceeds are being distributed to
insiders, and, if so, the offering should be flagged for further
review. (Form D, Item 16).
(9) Review whether the issuer is a pooled investment fund,
and, if so, determine whether the investment adviser to the
fund is appropriately registered with the state or the SEC as
an investment adviser and conduct a bad actor review of that
investment advisor. (Form D, Item 9).
(10) In Rule 506(c) offerings, consider whether to contact
the issuer or its counsel to determine what reasonable steps
are being taken to verify the accredited investor status of
purchasers. If the issuer accepts self-certification or otherwise
fails to engage in reasonable verification procedures, the issuer
would not be eligible to use Rule 506(c), and the state may
no longer be preempted from enforcing its own regulatory
regime. (Form D, Item 6).
(11) Review issuer size based on revenues and assets, and, if
the issuer has no revenues or no assets, or has "declined to
disclose," the offering should be flagged for further review.
(Form D, Item 5).
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(12) Review whether the issuer and its principals have strong
connections to their communities and whether the offering
involves reputable lawyers or financial intermediaries subject
to FINRA and state regulation. If not, the offering should
be flagged for further review. On the other hand, offerings
involving bonafide gatekeepers typically are less inclined to be
fraudulent. (Form D, Item 1, Item 2, Item 12 and Signature).
(13) Review Form D for its completeness, and, if answers are
either incorrect, nonresponsive, or not provided, the offering
should be flagged for further review. Note Rule 503(a), which
states that an issuer must file an amendment to Form D
to correct material mistakes of facts or errors as soon as
practicable after discovery (unless the change reflects only
certain information prescribed in the rule), and the issuer
must file a Form D annually if the offering is continuing
beyond one year. (Form D).
(14) Locate and review the issuer's website, if any, to
determine whether inconsistencies appear when compared
to the Form D. (Form D).2 68
These draft guidelines provide only one example of how Form Ds' sixteen
questions, as they presently stand without the SEC's proposed content
enhancements, might be more thoughtfully reviewed. Without doubt,
experienced state regulators, coordinated by NASAA, could develop a more
in-depth and effective model. NASAAs development of Form D review
guidelines should prove significantly beneficial to both novice and experienced
regulators in conducting their Form D reviews. Once in place, NASAA's
uniform review guidelines should be "generally advertised," as part of an "issuer
education" program. Many dishonest issuers and their counsel, if any, would
soon realize that the states are both empowered and engaged in the marketplace
for private placements of both covered and disrobed securities.
B. Implementation of the Electronic Form D Depository
Over a decade ago, I proposed that the states develop a web-based central
notification depository, coordinated by NASAA, that would be functionally
equivalent to the Central Registration Depository for market professionals,
268 The markers I have identified in these review guidelines should not be viewed as
necessarily problematic and, indeed, may be present for legitimate reasons.They are provided solely
to suggest that further review of a given offering might be warranted. See generally U.S. SEC. &
ExcH. COMM'N, FORM D, supra note 21I.
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which has been successfully established by NASAA and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD, now succeeded by FINRA).269
In NSMIA, Congress authorized the states, among other things, to require
issuers filing Form Ds with the SEC in connection with their private offerings
of securities to also file those Form Ds with state regulatory authorities, together
with attendant fees and consents to service of process. 27 0 Congress expressly
authorized state regulators to suspend any offering of securities made within
their respective states if issuers failed to file these forms.271 As discussed above,
the Form D provides significant investigatory opportunities. 27 2
The SEC, working with NASAA, modified Form D in 1986 to make it
a uniform notification form that could be filed both with the SEC and state
securities regulators.273 It has repeatedly recognized not only that Form D is
used by state securities regulators and FINRA to enforce securities laws, but
also serves as an important source of information for investors, information
vendors, venture capitalists, and an issuer's competitors.274 In 2008, to ensure
269 Warren, Reallocation, supra note 35, at So-u1. The Central Registration Depository
(CRD) facilitates simultaneous registration of broker-dealers and their agents with FINRA and
the states. See Central Registration Depository, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/compliance/
registration/crd/ (last visited Mar. 10, 204).
270 Securities Act of 1933 § i8(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77 r(c)(2)(A) (202).
271 Id. § 18(c)(3), § 77r(c)().
272 See supra Part III.A.
273 Form D and Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6663,5r Fed. Reg. 36,385 (Oct. to,
1986) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 239).'The SEC, at the time it imposed electronic filing
for Form Ds, stated,"[w]e modified the requirements relating to Form D in 1986, making Form D a
uniform notification form that could be filed with state securities regulators." Electronic Filing and
Revision of Form D, Securities Act Release No. 8891, Exchange Act Release No. 57,280, Investment
Company Act Release No. 28,r45, 73 Fed. Reg. 10,592, 10,592-93 (Feb. 27, 2008) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232 & 239)-
274 The SEC has repeatedly affirmed the broad purposes of Form D filings:
The staffs of state securities regulators and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA), the successor to the member firm regulatory functions of the National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and NYSE Regulation, Inc., also use Form
D information to enforce securities laws and the rules of securities self-regulatory
organizations. Form D filings also have become a source of information for investors.
Our Web site advises potential investors in Regulation D offerings to check whether
the company making the offering has filed a Form D notice and advises that "[i]f the
company has not filed a Form D, this should alert you that the company might not be
in compliance with the federal securities laws."In addition, the information in Form D
filings serves as a source of business intelligence for commercial information vendors,
as well as for participants in the venture capital, private equity, and other industries
that rely on Regulation D offerings and for competitors of companies that file Form
D information. Academic researchers use Form D information to conduct empirical
research aimed at improving the workings of these industries. Journalists use Form D
information to report on capital-raising in these industries.
Electronic Filing and Revision of Form D, Securities Act Release No. 8891, Exchange Act Release
No. 57,280, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,I45,73 Fed. Reg. at 10,593 (footnotes omitted).
Indeed, in its recent proposals for further amendment of Form D to expand its disclosure
requirements, the SEC stated, "we believe that the proposed changes to the filing and information
requirements of Form D could assist the enforcement efforts of both federal and state regulators,
which rely on Form D as an important source of information about the private offering market."
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that Form D would be more readily available to both regulators and the public,
the SEC issued new Form D rules requiring that Form Ds be filed electronically
through an online filing system that would automatically capture and tag
data items and make that data interactive and searchable.275 In its adopting
release, the SEC embraced the concept of "one stop filing" to promote greater
uniformity and coordination between federal and state securities regulation.276
As envisioned by the SEC, "[o]ne stop filing [would] enable companies to
file Form D information both with us and with the states they designate in
one electronic transaction. "277 It announced that it was already working with
NASAA to develop an interface between the SEC's electronic system and an
electronic system to be developed by NASAA that would receive the SEC's
filings and collect fees on behalf of participating states securities regulators. 278
Although the SEC stated that it "[has] been working actively with NASAA
to achieve that capability as soon as practicable,"2 7 1 this collaboration proved
to be painstakingly slow. Due to a communications breakdown with the SEC,
NASAA was already frustrated that the state filing system was not launched
in tandem with the SEC's electronic filing system.28 0 Instead, issuers could file
their Form Ds electronically with the SEC's Electronic Data Gathering and
Retrieval System (EDGAR) but had to continue filing paper copies with their
respective state regulators.2 11 In 2009, the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
soundly criticized the SEC's failure to effectively coordinate with NASAA
in the development of an EDGAR link to the NASAA sponsored system.28 2
Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156, Securities Act Release No. 94x6, Exchange
Act Release No. 69,960, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,595, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,8o6, 44,808
(proposed July 24, zo13) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 239).
275 Electronic Filing and Revision of Form D, Securities Act Release No. 8891, Exchange
Act Release No. 57,280, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,145,73 Fed. Reg. 10,592.
276 Id. at 10,594-95-
277 Id. at 10,594, 1o,62.
278 Id. at 1o,594. The SEC, in its release adopting Form D electronic filing requirements,
stated:
The system will enhance uniformity and coordination even more if it results in "one-
stop filing," an approach we and NASAA are exploring. One-stop filing will enable
companies to file Form D information both with us and with the states they designate
in one electronic transaction. While that capability will not be available when Form
D electronic filing with the Commission begins, we have been workin activel with
NASAA to achieve that capability as soon as practicable. We understadthtNSAA
is considering establishing its own new electronic system that would interface with
our system and would receive filings and collect fees on behalf of participating state
securities regulators. One-stop film will reduce significantly the costs and burdens
of preparing and filing Form D inormation with the Commission and with state
securities regulators. 'lis could represent a substantial savings for small businesses and
others filing Form D information.
Id. (footnote omitted).
279 Id.
280 See OIG REPORT, supra note 2o6, at 3.
281 Id. at vi.
282 Id. at 29-32.
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In an effort to remedy this failure, the OIG issued Recommendation 16, stating:
"The [SEC's] Division of Corporation Finance should timely and appropriately
coordinate with staff at [NASAA] to develop a system that can be linked to the
Commission's [EDGAR], enabling issuers to file Form D electronically with
the states."2 83 The SEC, in its response, stated simply, "We will continue to work
with NASAA on this."2m
Since the OIG's recommendation in 2009, progress has advanced at a glacial
pace. Approximately a year later, on April 5,2010, the SEC and NASAA entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding,285 in which the SEC agreed, upon prior
notice from NASAA, to include in SEC e-mails to issuers confirming their
successful Form D filings the following message: "STATE FILINGS: If you
also wish to file the information in your filing online with one or more U.S.
states or territories, please visit http://efd.nasaa.org." 286 'Ihe SEC further agreed
to coordinate its own EDGAR-based system with NASAA's developmental
stage electronic Form D depository, EFD, an acronym for Electronic Filing of
Form D.2 87
During the period following execution of the Memorandum of
Understanding, NASAA worked with a third party consultant to develop its
EFD system, but, nearing completion, that vendor unilaterally terminated the
contract.288 At the present time, NASAA, working through its Regulation D
Electronic Filing Committee, has negotiated a contract with another consultant,
which includes some 125 pages of detailed system requirements that will be
incorporated into the final contract.289 The NASAA committee now anticipates
that its EFD system will be fully operational within the next twelve months.29 0
283 Id. at 33, app. VI at 48.
284 Id. app. VII at 57.
285 Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. SEC and N. Am. Sec. Admrs Ass'n,
Inc. (Apr. 5, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/nasaa-mou-0405Io.pdf.
286 Id. at 2.
287 See id. at 2-3.
288 See Alan Parness, 7he Curmudgeon's Corner - Some Further 7houghts on Rule go6 Offerings,
MONDAQ (Sept. 12, 2012), www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/196328/Commodities+Derivatives+St
ock+Exchanges/lhe+Curmudgeons+Corner+Some+Further+'Ihoughts+On+Rule+5o6+Offerings.
289 See Telephone Interview with Faith Anderson, Chief of Registration & Gen. Counsel,
Wash. Dep't of Fin. Insts., Sec. Div. (Sept. 24, 2013).




The new system, designed to be much more user friendly than EDGAR, will
establish the following process:
(1) The issuer or its counsel files Form D electronically with
the SEC's EDGAR system.
(2) EDGAR generates an e-mail confirmation of receipt of
the Form D filing, providing an EFD link for the issuer to
make state Form D filings and payment of state filing fees.
(3) After the issuer clicks on the link, EFD will grab the
EDGAR data from the issuer's Form D and ask the issuer
to identify the state where the first sale has occurred and
additional states in which the issuer would like to file.
(4) The issuer will then check off those states online.
(5) EFD will then present an invoice for related filing fees.
(6) The issuer will then provide credit card information for
electronic payment of fees, which EFD will then remit to
state securities authorities.29'
While issuers may also file their Form Ds directly with the EFD without going
through the EDGAR link, they are likely to benefit in terms of time, cost, and
efficiency by use of the EDGAR-EFD one stop filing system.29 2 Once in place,
the EFD filing system should be accessible not only to issuers and their counsel
but also to investors and the general public as a valuable source of information
on private offerings in their respective communities. 293
The prompt implementation of the EFD system will represent an important
advance in federal-state coordination of securities regulation in the private
offering marketplace. As the SEC concluded some five years ago, "[o]ne-stop
filing will reduce significantly the costs and burdens ofpreparing and filing Form
D information with the Commission and with state securities regulators." 294
Moreover, it is likely to result in substantial savings for small businesses engaged
in exempt private offerings of their securities. NASAAs EFD system, hoped to
be in full operation next year, will constructively complement the collective
291 See Interview with Faith Anderson, supra note 289.
292 Electronic Filing and Revision of Form D, Securities Act Release No. 8891, Exchange
Act Release No. 57,280, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,145,73 Fed. Reg. 10,592, 10,593-94
(Feb. 27, 2008) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232 & 239).
293 See id. at 10,594, 10,595, 10,597-
294 Id. at 10,594-
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efforts of the states to monitor and enforce the SEC's exemptive scheme for
both Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c) private offerings. 295
C. Development ofthe BadActor Database
The SEC's recent adoption of Rule 506 bad actor rules, as mandated by
the Dodd-Frank Act, has imposed vitally important obligations on virtually
all issuers of private offerings under Regulation D.296 For the first time in the
thirty-year history of Regulation D, issuers will be disqualified from reliance on
the Rule 506 exemption from registration if they or their associated principals
and promoters have been subject to a broad array of disqualifying events.2 97
While I have recognized in this Article that this regulatory development is
"good news" for state regulators, it also imposes new responsibilities on those
regulators to ensure compliance. In fulfilling those responsibilities, state
regulators-and the local marketplaces they protect-would greatly benefit
from the creation of a publicly accessible bad actor database (BAD) that would
permit issuers, securities lawyers, promoters, financial intermediaries, and,
most importantly, investors, to identify those bad actors before bad deals are
consummated and investors' savings are lost.
The SEC's bad actor rule, Rule 506(d), sets forth a laundry list of "covered
persons"298 subject to another laundry list of "disqualifying events,"29 9 as
summarized respectively, below:
Covered Persons
* The issuer and any predecessor of the issuer or affiliated
issuer;
* Any director, executive officer, other officer participating in
the offering, general partner or managing member of the
issuer;
* Any beneficial owner of 20% or more of the issuer's
outstanding voting equity securities, calculated on the basis
of voting power;
* Any investment manager to an issuer that is a pooled
investment fund and any director, executive officer, other
officer participating in the offering, general partner or
managing member of any such investment manager, as well
as any director, executive officer or officer participating in the
295 See id. at 5o,593 & n.30, 1o,612.
296 See Disqualification of Felons and Other "Bad Actors" from Rule 5o6 Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 9454, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,730, 44,737 (July 24, 2ol3) (to be codified at 7
C.F.R. pts. 200, 230 & 239).
297 Id. at 44,731-32.
298 Id. at 44,737 (citing Rule 5o6(d)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.5 06(d)(i) (2013)).
299 Id at 44,73738.
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offering of any such general partner or managing member;
* Any promoter connected with the issuer in any capacity at
the time of the sale;
* Any person that has been or will be paid (directly or
indirectly) remuneration for solicitation of purchasers in
connection with sales of securities in the offering (which we
refer to as a "compensated solicitor"); and
* Any director, executive officer, other officer participating in
the offering, general partner, or managing member of any
such compensated solicitor.
Disqualifying Events
* Criminal convictions (felony or misdemeanor), entered
within the last five years in the case of issuers and ten years
in the case of other covered persons, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security; involving the making
of a false filing with the Commission; or arising out of the
conduct of the business of an underwriter, broker, dealer,
municipal securities dealer, investment adviser or paid
solicitor of purchasers of securities;
* Court injunctions and restraining orders, including any
order,judgment or decree ... entered within five years before
such sale, that, at the time of such sale, restrains or enjoins
such person from engaging or continuing to engage in any
conduct or practice in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security; involving the making of any false filing with the
Commission; or arising out of the conduct of the business
of an underwriter, broker, dealer, municipal securities dealer,
investment adviser or paid solicitor of purchasers of securities;
* Final orders issued by state banking, credit union, and
insurance regulators, federal banking regulators, and the
National Credit Union Administration that either create
a bar from association with any entity regulated by the
regulator issuing the order, or from engaging in the business
of securities, insurance or banking or from savings association
or credit union activities; or are based on a violation of any
law or regulation that prohibits fraudulent, manipulative, or
deceptive conduct within the last ten years;
* Commission disciplinary orders .. . that, at time of the sale,
suspend or revoke a person's registration as a broker, dealer,
municipal securities dealer or investment adviser; place
limitations on the activities, functions or operations of such
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person; or bar such person from being associated with any
entity or from participating in the offering of any penny
stock;
* Suspension or expulsion from membership in, or suspension
or a bar from association with a member of, an SRO, i.e.,
a registered national securities exchange or a registered
national or affiliated securities association;
* Stop orders . . . and orders suspending the Regulation A
exemption ... filed .. .within the last five years [before such
sale]; and
* U.S. Postal Service false representation orders . . . entered
within five years.'
These respective criteria involve relatively unique data points that provide
particular challenges for issuers and theii counsel and, perhaps, even for
regulators in their search for bad actors in unregistered private offerings. All but
the most sophisticated investors would be befuddled and certainly frustrated in
any online searches they undertake to protect themselves.
The SEC accords issuers limited protection by the inclusion of a reasonable
care exception.30' In circumstances where an issuer that has commenced or
completed a private offering under Rule 506 realizes the offering is tainted by
the involvement of bad actors, the offering will not be disqualified if the issuer
can show that it did not, and in the exercise of "reasonable care," could not
have known of the disqualification. 02 The issuer seeking to save its Rule 506
exemption would have the burden of proof in establishing its own reasonable
care and, accordingly, the applicability of the exception. 03 The SEC has further
limited the reasonable care exception through its adoption of a regulatory
instruction:
An issuer will not be able to establish that it has exercised reasonable care
unless it has made, in light of the circumstances,factual inquiry into whether
any disqualifications exist. 'The nature and scope of the factual inq will
vary based on the facts and circumstances concerning, among other things,
the issuer and the other offering participantsN
300 Id. (footnotes omitted). For an excellent synopsis of both the dual Rule 506 exemptions
and the bad actor rules applicable to those exemptions, see Paul Weiss, Client Memorandum, How
Will the SEC's New Reg D Rules Affect Offerings by Private Funds? (Jul. 27, 2013), available at www.
paulweiss.com/media/17x7486/i7julyi3_sec.pdf.
301 See Disqualification ofFelons and Other "Bad Actors"from Rule 506 Offerings, Securities
Act Release No. 9414, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,745-47. The SEC based its reasonable care exception on
the NASAA-approved Model Accredited Investor Exemption, which requires issuers to perform
factual inquiries before asserting the reasonable care exception. Id. at 44,746.
302 See id. at 44,745.
303 See id. at 44,771.
304 Id. (emphasis added).
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The SEC, in its Rule 506(d) adopting release, expressly declined "to prescribe
specific steps as ... necessary or sufficient to establish reasonable care."3 05 While
suggesting that, at least where no red flags are evident, the required factual
inquiry might be accomplished through questionnaires and certifications,
perhaps accompanied by covenants and contractual representations, the SEC
has not provided any definitive guidance.30 6 This reasonable care based on factual
inquiry standard also applies to the SEC's newly imposed obligation that the
issuer must make written disclosures of any disqualifying events that occurred
before the effective date of the rule to all investors, prior to their purchase of
the issuer's securities. 0 Regardless of whether they are ultimately positioned
to assert reasonable care defenses, issuers are now required by Form D to certip
to the SEC and state regulators and, in effect, to represent to investors, that
they are not disqualified.30 s Of course investors are not protected by the issuer's
reasonable care defense and may indeed suffer grievous losses when issuers
who were disqualified proclaim after the fact, "oops, but I made reasonable
factual inquiries." This "oops" excuse would not appear viable if the issuer did
not rationally undertake the factual inquiry in a way that would actually cover
the numerous data points prescribed by the rule.
Most small businesses, particularly start-ups, are likely to find it extremely
difficult to undertake the due diligence required to ferret out the "covered
persons" under the rule, much less the various "disqualifying events" identified.
For those few who turn to experienced securities counsel, they will find that no
standardized procedures or "best practices" have been established. Most lawyers
routinely Google their new clients for risk management and due diligence
reasons and, in connection with securities offerings, generally require officers,
305 Id. at 44,746.
306 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. With regard to the timing of the bad actor
determination, the SEC has recently interpreted Rule 5o6(d) as requiring issuers to make those
determinations "any time they are offering or selling securities in reliance on Rule 506."SecuritiesAct
Rules: Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (C&DI's), Question 260.14, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
CoMMIssIoN (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-
interps.htm. The SEC stated:
An issuer may reasonably rely on a covered person's agreement to provide notice of
a potential or actual bad actor triggering event pursuant to, for example, contractual
covenants, bylaw requirements, or an undertaking in a questionnaire or certification.
However, if an offering is continuous, delayed or long-lived, the issuer must update its
factual inquiry periodically through bring-down of representations, questionnaires and
certifications, negative consent letters, periodic re-checking of public databases, and
other steps, depending on the circumstances.
Id.
307 See supra note 136 and accompanying text; see also Disqualification of Felons and Other
"Bad Actors" from Rule 5o6 Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9414, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,745-47
(discussing the reasonable care exception).
308 See Disqualification of Felons and Other "Bad Actors" from Rule 506 Offerings,
Securities Act Release No. 9414, 78 Fed. Reg. at 44,771. The SEC amended Form D to require
certification by any issuer claiming a Regulation D exemption that "the issuer is not disqualified
from relying on Regulation D for one of the reasons stated in Rule 5 o5 (b)(2)(iii) or Rule 506(d)."Id.
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directors, and controlling persons to complete insider questionnaires-and now,
perhaps, disqualification questionnaires-to identify any adverse regulatory
histories."* With respect to new clients undertaking private placements, an
issuer's securities lawyer might obtain client releases and choose among a varied
menu of background checks available from third party vendors. 10 In performing
their customary due diligence on an issuer's securities offering, lawyers typically
perform background checks that include proper formation and good standing,
verification of necessary professional and business licenses and registrations,
UCC checks, credit reports, and CRD information accessed through Broker
Check.311 However, good faith efforts to mine these typically used databases,
while generally necessary to satisfy due diligence standards, are not likely to
reveal complete securities enforcement regulatory histories of those involved in
a particular securities offering.312 Such databases simply do not cover the data
points set forth in Rule 506(d), no matter how intense the good faith of the
effort. In other words, the background searches undertaken are not rationally
tied to those precise data points and to my knowledge no database has been
created, and none has been mandated by the SEC, that would present the
required information. This, of course, begs the question whether a reasonable
care defense should-or can-protect issuers when their factual inquiries,
including multiple background checks undertaken at considerable expense, are
simply not designed to reach all of the covered persons and disqualifying events
prescribed by the rule.
Based on my own prior experience as a securities lawyer and my continual
discussions with active practitioners, securities lawyers do not follow any
standard processes to determine bad actor participation in private securities
offerings and, in fact, cannot easily access the types of information required
by the rule. For example, state civil and administrative orders, including those
against unregistered sales agents, are supposed to be filed with the CRD by
state regulators on Form U-6's but often are not.11 3 Even if lawyers pursue
the arduous and time-consuming challenge of taking covered persons through
links on NASAXs website and the websites of the fifty state regulators,
the results are unlikely to be complete. Moreover, civil and administrative
actions have not been merged with criminal actions into a single database.3 14
Securities regulators themselves have substantial difficulties in scraping off bad
actor data from multiple databases. 31 s Issuers and their lawyers, even in those
private offerings where issuers retain them, may simply decide to do the best
309 See Interview with Rick Fleming, supra note 290.
310 Interview with Carolyn Duncan, supra note 213.
311 See id.
312 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
313 See Interview with Carolyn Duncan, supra note 213.
314 Id.




they can under the circumstances, knowing that they cannot state with any
real confidence that their clients' offerings are clean. If a BAD system were
in place, it would enable bona fide issuers and their lawyers to make rational
factual inquiries by accessing a centralized database that actually provides, at
least to the extent practicable, the best information available on the prescribed
covered persons and disqualifiing events. Indeed, best practice standards would
immediately include a required search of the BAD system. In developing the
system, NASAA could defray its expense by charging reasonable access fees to
issuers and their counsel, who in turn would have an electronic trail to evidence
their factual inquiries. Most importantly, use of the BAD system would serve to
filter private offerings and thus achieve early stage protection of retail and other
investors. The BAD system would vastly enhance the protection of investors
in private offerings, who presently are even more challenged than bona fide
issuers by the daunting task of determining whether the promoters offering
unregistered securities are frequent flyers.
The standard advice now offered investors by NASAA and state regulators
is to visit their websites, read the investor alerts, click the links to Broker Check,
and telephone their offices. 16 As previously discussed, however, this process,
though obviously providing significant protection, remains amorphous. State
enforcement data has not yet been centralized in a single NASAA database,
much less the civil and criminal histories of the entities and individuals covered
by the bad actor rule. NASAA's creation of a database tailored to those persons
covered by the bad actor rule and to the disqualifying events prescribed would
solve the conundrum now faced by both issuers and investors. With the BAD
system in place, investors would be able to ascertain with more certainty whether
bad actors are participants in a given offering. Granted, the BAD system would
hardly be perfect. Perpetrators of securities law violations are not tagged
with social security numbers or other identifiers in most criminal, civil, and
administrative proceedings.They often have common names, often change their
names, and often use relatives and other cohorts as fronts in their operations.
While no database can ever be free of flaws, the BAD system would offer a great
deal more protection than presently available. It would arm issuers, investors,
and securities regulators themselves with an invaluable tool in the fight against
securities fraud. Certainly, it would significantly complement the impressive
results achieved by NASAA and state regulators in recent years through the
development of extensive investor education programs designed to improve the
financial literacy ofretail investors in their respective communities." According
to FINRA's recent fraud susceptibility study, most retail investors are unable to
316 How to Check Out Your Broker or Investment Adviser, NASAA, http://www.nasaa.
org/2709/how-to-check-out-your-broker-or-investment-adviser/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
317 See Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the Comm. on Fin. Sers., Improving
Financial Literacy: Working Together to Develop Private Sector Coordination and Solutions, NASAA
(Sept. 28, 2oo6), http://www.nasaa.org/858/nasaa-written-statement-on-investor-education-
submitted-to-house-committee-on-financial-services-subcommittee/.
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identify the classic red flags of fraud and approximately 40% of investors found
"fully guaranteed" investments and investments offering 110% annual returns
appealing financial opportunities, despite the fact that these investments are
"too good to be true.""' NASAA and the state regulators obviously should
be encouraged to continue development of their investor education programs,
including online courses, seminars, and curriculum enhancement in our schools,
in order to reduce investor susceptibility to securities fraud. These programs are
admirably geared toward teaching investors how to invest. The BAD system
would provide these investors with a creditable list of who not to trust.
CONCLUSION
Congress, in Title II of the JOBS Act, concluded that what the country
needed was a fundamental change in the regulatory structure of its primary
capital market. What we needed, in order to help small businesses secure
investment capital and then create jobs for our citizens, was two clear-cut
regulatory options. If a company wants to raise equity or debt capital from the
general public, it should be positioned to choose between a "bright offering"
of securities or a "dark offering" of securities. A bright offering of securities,
available through the federal registration process, would entail administrative
review of a biblically extensive core disclosure document, accompanied
by audited financial statements, imposing strict liability for material
misrepresentations and omissions, and triggering publicly available periodic
reporting requirements. Alternatively, a dark offering of securities, available
through the federal exemptive process, would entail no registration at the state
or federal level, no formal preparation and delivery of a disclosure document,
no administrative review, no audited financial statements, no strict liability
for material misrepresentations and omissions, and no periodic reporting
requirements. In other words, issuers should be able to choose between a fully
sunlit offering and sunlit operations thereafter or a dark offering followed by an
operational life in the shadows.
Of course, since the advent of our dual regulatory system in the United
States, the light versus dark options have always been there. What has recently
changed is the manner in which those offerings might be conducted. If you
wanted to offer to the general public, an issuer had to pursue the bright offering.
If the issuer wanted to stay dark, it had to offer its securities privately, either
to insiders or to outsiders who had physical and intellectual access to the
company's core information. While the bright option has remained generally
the same over the past eighty years, the dark option gradually was liberalized,
at first to the point where issuers could offer securities privately to investors
318 See APPLIED RESEARCH & CONSULTING LLC, FINANCIAL FRAUD AND FRAUD
SUSCEPTIBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: RESEARCH REPORT - PREPARED FOR THE FINRA




who did not have access to the company's core information, but with whom the
issuer had some substantive pre-existing relationship and who earned $200,000
a year or were worth $1,000,000.311 The only major restraint was that those
issuers launching dark offerings were prohibited from offering their securities
to the general public. 'They could not offer and sell securities on Sirius XM
Radio, television commercials or other broadcast media, through newspaper
and magazine ads, or through solicitations on the sides of buses and on highway
billboards, through cold calls to strangers listed in phone books or the Internet.
In other words, dark offerings had to be cast to a narrow range of potential
investors.
In enacting the JOBS Act, Congress decided, as a matter of public policy
aimed at promoting capital formation and creating jobs, to eliminate the ban
on general solicitation in the conduct of private placements. 2 1 In its view,
issuers should be able to solicit investments from everyone, through widespread
public advertising, so long as, in the end, only those earning $200,000 a year or
worth a million dollars actually bought the advertised securities. Congress has
assumed that these presumptively rich investors surely can fend for themselves
and do not need the protection afforded by a formal disclosure document, do
not need access to core information about the issuer and its securities, and do
not need any presale review by state or federal regulators. In other words-'just
go advertise everywhere and sell to these people.'That way businesses, whether
large or small, on the up and up or dishonest thieves, could offer and sell their
pieces of paper to the world at large. To Congress, this brand new world of
capital formation sounded like a great idea. To state regulators and investor
protection advocates, it represents one of the worst ideas ever. 'Ihe SEC had
no choice. Under a congressional mandate to implement the new exemption
for "public" private placements, the SEC has recently promulgated new rules,
bifurcating Rule 506 into a private or "quiet" Rule 506(b) exemption and a
public or "noisy" Rule 506(c) exemption permitting general solicitation of the
entire population base so long as the purchasers are verifiedaccredited investors.
Because securities offered under Rule 506 exemption are deemed "covered
securities," state regulatory authorities are precluded from applying the presale
investor protection afforded by their own registration and exemptive schemes.3 21
In this Article, I have generally addressed the impact of Title II of the
JOBS Act on state regulatory authorities as the SEC's partners in our country's
dual regulatory system. I have provided a foundation for this analysis by first
319 Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule i4 4 A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No.
69,959,78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,771 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.FR. pts. 23o, 239 & 242).
320 158 CONG. REc. S17 19 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2012) (statement of Sen. Landrieu) (quoting
Letter fromJack E. Herstein, President, NASAA, Ass't Dir., Bureau of Sec., Neb. Dep't of Banking
& Fin., to Harry M. Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate & Mitch McConnell, Minority Leader,
U.S. Senate (Mar. 12, 2012)).
321 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
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describing the regulatory context in which the role of the states in protecting
retail investors has been generally restricted through preemptive strikes
at the authority of the states to regulate private offerings in their respective
communities. Indeed, from my discussion of how NSMIA and JOBS Act
preemption constrains the role of the states in providing early stage, presale
protection of investors in unregistered private offerings of securities, one might
conclude the states should simply yield the presale regulatory work to the SEC,
even though that agency has traditionally looked the other way when it comes
to private placements of securities.322 Instead, in the final section of this Article,
I conclude that the state regulatory authorities still have a vital role to play
in filling this regulatory gap. First, they should enhance the newly expanded
Rule 506 exemptions through monitoring and enforcing the rule's accompanying
regulatory restrictions, thereby providing the early stage protection at the state
level that has not been traditionally provided at the federal level. Through their
enforcement of the federal exemptive scheme, the states would complement the
federal scheme and further the cause of regulatory harmony in the protection of
investors in our private placement marketplace. Second, I have encouraged the
states, acting collectively through NASAA, to implement their own electronic
one stop filing systems of Form D notices under Regulation D as soon as
possible, linking the SEC's EDGAR system with a new NASAA administered
EFD system for coordinated filing by issuers and their counsel. Finally, I
have recommended that NASAA develop a bad actor database (BAD) that
322 Indeed,the SEC's Office oflnspector General (OIG) has found that the SEC's Division of
Corporate Finance "does not generally take action when [it] learn [s] that issuers have not complied
with the requirements of the Regulation D exemptions." OIG REPORT, supra note 206, at v. It
further found that the SEC Division of Corporate Finance "does not substantively review the more
than 20,000 Form D filings that it receives annually."Id. Moreover, the SEC has never sought, at
least at the time of the OIG Report, any temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunctive relief from
any court against an issuer for failure to file the Form D required by Rule 503(a) of Regulation D.
See id. at 5. As a result of its study, the OIG specifically recommended that the SEC develop "a
process to assess and better ensure issuers' compliance with Regulation D[, including] a periodic
review of the Form D filings, an assessment of the accuracy and timeliness of the filings, and the
identification of problems or 'red flags' with the filings."Id. at i2. The OI further recommended
that when the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance believes issuers have materially misused
the Regulation D exemptions, it "should take appropriate action such as contacting the offenders,
and/or referring the matter(s) to the Division of Enforcement, the appropriate state regulator or
other regulatory authority." Id. (emphasis added). The SEC's response aptly illustrates its disdain
for private placement regulation: "It does not appear that the Commission intended for the Form
D notice to be a vehicle for detecting Regulation D violations or fraud or abuse in the sale of
securities, nor that it intended for Form D to be a vehicle to provide disclosure to investors." Id.
at app. VI, at 5o. Yet the SEC continuously reaffirms the value of Form D review for enforcement
purposes by state securities regulatory authorities stating that "the information in Form D filings
has been useful for a number of ... purposes, such as serving as a source of information for investors
and facilitating the enforcement of the federal securities laws and the enforcement efforts of state
securities regulators and FINRA." See, e.g., Amendments to Regulation D, Form D and Rule 156,
Securities Act Release No. 9416, Exchange Act Release No. 69,960, Investment Company Act
Release No. 30,595, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,8o6, 44,8io (proposed July 24, 2013) (footnote omitted) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 239).
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is tailored to the data points set forth in the SEC's recently promulgated bad
actor rule disqualifying issuers from using the Rule 506 exemption where the
issuer and associated persons have adverse regulatory histories.'The BAD system
proposed would provide crucial assistance to bona fide issuers in screening
their offerings and in satisfying their reasonable "factual inquiry" standard of
care. Most importantly, it would allow retail investors to determine whether
those offering the investment opportunities have clean regulatory histories. The
new world of generally solicited private placements, exempt from both state
and federal registration, presents vastly expanded challenges for the states in
protecting their local investors. State regulatory authorities, however impeded
by preemption, must continue to do what they do best, protecting investors in
local securities markets before their losses are incurred.323
323 See generally Warren, Dual Regulation, supra note 14 (discussing the history of states
protecting investors in securities markets).
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